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0. Research Plan: A Synopsis
I have two research goals in this paper:
1) Provide a new theory of classical liberalism: “The Three Principles”.
2) Apply that theory to the debate about the justifications of the welfare state.
The first goal requires that the classical liberal tradition provides such a framework. 
My hypothesis is that this tradition can be encapsulated in Three Principles, the first 
two of which – property rights and limited government – form the libertarian core of 
the society. The third principle – the principle of welfare - is built on top of this 
libertarian core, and complements it, by creating the boundary conditions within which 
the spontaneous order of the market may operate. These principles can be justified on 
rights-grounds, or on consequentialist grounds. I take a consequentialist approach.
My second goal proceeds from the assumption that we need to rethink some of the 
current philosophical discussion around the issues of the welfare state.  I believe that 
today's defenders of the welfare state often forget about the importance of property 
rights and individual freedoms in the prosperity of the society. I also believe that 
today's libertarians – who are the most principled defenders of property rights and 
individual freedoms - often forget about the importance of public institutions, and of 
limited welfare redistribution, in improving the society. So, to what extent can we 
combine the concern for liberty with the concern for the poor? My hypothesis, based on
Smith and Hayek, is that we can apply the Three Principles of Liberalism to provide the
outlines of a classical liberal, or bleeding-heart libertarian, limited welfare state.
Chapter 1: In the introduction, I argue that there, indeed, is a classical liberal doctrine, 
which can be distinguished from libertarianism and social/welfare liberalism.
Chapter 2: I propose that the classical liberal doctrine can be abstracted from the 
tradition. It is supported by Locke, Hayek, Smith, Tomasi and many others. It consists 
of Three Principles: 1) Strong private property rights; 2) Limited government; and 3) 
Limited welfarism. It protects freedom from coercion through setting limits into law. I 
call this the “doctrine of the limits.” On top of the first two libertarian Principles, the 
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doctrine allows for a limited range of activities for the public good (Principle 3).
Chapter 3: John Locke provides a systematic defence of the first two principles of 
liberalism. I will show that the best reason for accepting private property rights and 
limited government is not the rights-based approach, which is very problematic, but 
rather the consequentialist argument that private ownership, free exchange and the 
limited government are useful instruments for the development and progress of the 
commercial society of free and equal people. This argument, which also appears in 
Smith and Hayek, suggests that the Three Principles are a necessary condition for 
universal opulence and the peaceful co-existence of free and equal citizens.
Chapters 4: The libertarians provide a coherent theory, where the consequentialist 
parts of Locke, and the utilitarian aims of the society, are brushed aside. The classical 
liberal doctrine of limits is turned into the libertarian doctrine of the minimal state. It 
has absolute property rights and little else. I will show that this doctrine is 
unsatisfactory, because a) it does not allow for Pareto-improvements that the 
government can make; and b) it does not guarantee citizens even a minimal social 
safety net of the sort that any decent society should have. Thus the libertarian rights-
based reading of the doctrine is inferior to the consequentialist reading of them.
Chapter 5: The proposed solution is the limited welfare state. John Tomasi, Adam 
Smith and Friedrich Hayek provide good blueprints for a bleeding-heart libertarian 
interpretation of the Three Principles of liberalism. They accept the Lockean 
framework of strong property rights and limited government; but they also accept the 
provision of a limited range of public goods on consequentialist grounds.
Chapter 6: Next I propose the so-called Basic Income Guarantee as an example of a 
welfare mechanism that can be, and overwhelmingly has been, defended by such 
bleeding-heart and classical liberals, as a way to apply the Three Principles into a legal 
and political framework. It provides an alternative to non-liberal welfare states. 
Chapter 7-8: Concluding, I gather the pieces together, and explore some of the open 
problems and suggestions for further research. The consequentialist reading of classical
liberalism (from Locke to Smith to Hayek to Tomasi) justifies a strong notion of 
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property rights, because thick property rights under a limited government are extremely 
useful, perhaps vital, for the peace, prosperity and progress of the society. But there are 
also consequentialist reasons to provide a limited range of state interventions – namely, 
enough to provide a limited range of public goods and guaranteed basic welfare, but not
enough to damage the market economy.
1. Introduction: What is Classical Liberalism?
“The subject of this Essay is […] Civil, or Social Liberty: the nature and limits 
of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the 
individual.” (Mill: 1)
This thesis offers an interpretation of the classical liberal tradition. Liberalism is a 
philosophical doctrine that emphasizes freedom. Freedom is seen as a fundamental 
value to govern social and political life. I will mainly defend its usefulness.
There are many definitions of freedom, and many different varieties of liberalism. I will
mostly leave aside the social liberal tradition of John Rawls and others, although my 
analysis will undoubtedly provide interesting parallels to that tradition. I am concerned 
with the classical liberal tradition of John Locke, Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek, James
Buchanan, Milton Friedman, John Tomasi, etc. I will compare and contrast it with the 
libertarian tradition of Herbert Spencer, Jan Narveson, Robert Nozick, etc.
I will defend a reading of classical liberalism that is compatible with a) strong 
libertarian principles – thick property rights, economic freedom and limited 
government – and with b) a limited range of welfare and other public services. I believe
my interpretation is a fair abstraction from the philosophical tradition of Locke, Smith, 
Hayek, et al., although it is obviously not the only way to interpret that tradition.
First, I need to proof that there is such a thing as a "classical liberal paradigm". Then I 
need to define what it is, by summarizing its basic tenets in a systematic manner.
I have no doubt that Rawlsian social liberals and Nozickean libertarians will have a 
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different interpretation of what constitutes the essence of the classical tradition. This is 
perfectly reasonable. Having different perspectives, and different interpretations, on 
what constitutes the essential features of a tradition helps to keep the tradition alive. I 
agree with Alasdair MacIntyre's general advice (1980: 62):
”What constitutes a tradition is a conflict of interpretations of that 
tradition, a conflict which itself has a history susceptible of rival 
interpretations. If I am a Jew, I have to recognize that the tradition of 
Judaism is partly constituted by a continuous argument over what it 
means to be a Jew.” 
I have to recognize that the tradition of liberalism is partly constituted by a continuous 
argument over what it means to be a liberal. There is no ”neutral” definition of 
liberalism. All definitions of liberalism are interpretations. So let me propose one 
interpretation, which is my contribution to that continuous argument.
I will start with Hayek's definition of freedom as freedom from coercion:
”Coercion occurs when one man's actions are made to serve another man's will, 
not for his own but for the other's purpose.” (CoL: 198) "Free society has met 
this problem by conferring the monopoly of coercion on the state and by 
attempting to limit this power of the state to instances where it is required to 
prevent coercion by private persons. This is possible only by the state's 
protecting known private spheres of the individuals against interference by 
others and delimiting these private spheres" (CoL: 71-72)
This means that freedom places limits on coercive actions. There is a wide range of 
coercive actions, but the most dangerous is the threat of physical aggression and 
violence. The two greatest sources of potential aggression are from 1) one's fellow 
citizens and 2) the state under which one lives. Freedom, in order to have a breathing 
space, requires limits on both these forms of coercion: private and state-sponsored.
Freedom is achieved by limiting one kinds of actions – coercive ones – in order to 
encourage other kinds of actions – non-coercive ones. The result is the increase of 
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voluntary exchanges within the parameters of the law. Within those limits, people are 
free to act without consideration of the resulting overall pattern. The lack of a clear 
pattern, in fact, is a desirable consequence of freedom (as long as we can assume that 
most people are better off in the long-run). As Hayek emphasizes, it is not because we 
know that liberty will benefit particular people for particular reasons, but precisely 
because we do not know the particular effects (but only that the effects are generally 
positive), that we must embrace its unforeseeable results: "Freedom granted only when 
it is known beforehand that its effects will be beneficial is not freedom. If we knew how
freedom would be used, the case for it would largely disappear." (CoL: 83)
At the heart of the classical liberal paradigm is the limited government. The limited 
government opposes all ”absolute, arbitrary, unlimited, and unlimitable Power”. 
(Locke, TTG: I, §9) The liberal government must be its opposite: non-absolute, non-
arbitrary and limited. As Hayek puts it, "[t]he coercion which the government must still
use [...] is reduced to a minimum and made as innocuous as possible by restraining it 
through known general rules." (CoL: 72) The limited government is only concerned 
with general, abstract notions of justice, and not with concrete notions of what 
particular people ought to do. People are seen as individuals with their own life plans. 
Such a limited state is not the same as the so-called minimal state. This is the difference
between classical liberalism and hardcore libertarianism. Minimal state restricts itself to
the enforcement of property rights via the justice system, and protection against internal
and external threats, and nothing else. (Cf. Nozick: 149) Classical liberalism, too, 
acknowledges that the minimal state functions are a necessary, and perhaps the most 
important, precondition for the liberal society. The protect people from coercion and 
thus enable freedom. This forms the "libertarian core" of classical liberalism. But the 
minimal state is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition, for a good society. 
Libertarianism is not enough. We also need to have a state capable of providing a 
limited range of public goods and some form of a social safety net.
As will become apparent, from Locke and Smith to Hayek and Tomasi, the libertarian 
core of the classical liberal paradigm has been seen to need a few corrections. These 
include, but are not limited to: democratic decision-making, the promotion of basic 
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welfare, the provision of public goods and the correction of market failures (such as 
externalities and neighbourhood effects). In my essay, I will argue that such a positive 
role of the government constitutes a necessary part of the classical liberal paradigm. We
need to go beyond the minimal state to achieve the liberal utopia that Nozick (297ff.) so
beautifully dreams of. But, at the same token, we must keep our ambitions modest.
I want to argue that, from these grounds, we can reconstruct a comprehensive doctrine, 
which incorporates only a few basic tenets. I believe that there is a central theme that 
unifies many of the greatest thinkers in the tradition: the construction of a society where
freedom from coercion, both against private and public entities, is guaranteed under the
rule of law, and where any government actions beyond that, even while acceptable for 
the sake of the public good, must be carefully bounded by liberal principles. These 
principles are universal, despite the many dissimilarities between individual thinkers.
These principles can be combined to form a coherent plan for a limited but robust 
welfare state. The end result can be called "classical liberal", "bleeding-heart 
libertarian” or - why not - “welfare libertarian”.
By rediscovering the classical liberal tradition, it is possible to defend a regime of 
limited government, which tolerates a high degree of diversity, and has no 
comprehensive plan for society, but which also leaves room, for reasons of overall 
utility, for building robust – or even antifragile1 - institutions that promote the public 
good. The end result is a (more-than-minimal-but-)limited welfare state.
To sum up, I define classical liberalism as the defence of Three Principles:
1) Freedom from private coercion (PRIVATE PROPERTY)
2) Freedom from public coercion (LIMITED GOVERNMENT)
3) State provision of limited public goods (LIMITED WELFARE STATE)
1 Nassim Taleb (2012) defines antifragility as the capacity of a system to benefit from disorder, as 
opposed to a fragile system that benefits from order (and stagnation). He claims that an antifragile 
system is different from a merely robust system, because a robust system merely survives disorder, 
but an antifragile system actually becomes stronger. A market economy under a suitable system of the
rule of law is an example of an antifragile system, because it benefits from sudden shocks, changes 
and transformations that allow it to thrive by a processs of continuous self-renewal. See also: 
Schumpeter's (1941) “creative destruction” and Hayek's (1960) “spontaneous order.”
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Classical liberalism, in addition to being a doctrine of maximizing free and voluntary 
human cooperation, is a doctrine of legal limits to coercive action. These limits are 
incorporated into the concepts of the private sphere and the limited government. The 
limits enable freedom, and freedom is a necessary condition for a good society.
I will, henceforth, proceed to defend the following assumptions:
1. That there is such a thing as a coherent set of classical liberal principles.
2. That these principles can be roughly summed up in the following three:
a) Freedom from private coercion: PRIVATE PROPERTY 
b) Freedom from public coercion: LIMITED GOVERNMENT
c) State provision of limited public goods: THE LIMITED WELFARE STATE 
3. That the libertarian interpretation is not sufficient for a good society;
4. That the classical liberal interpretation is sufficient for a good society;
5. That such a theory provides a blueprint for a limited welfare state.
The purpose is to defend a substantially libertarian but non-hardcore reading of 
classical liberalism from a Lockean-Smithean-Hayekian perspective. It produces new 
perspectives on the vital relationship that liberty has to the welfare state.
2. The Three Principles of Liberalism 
Let me try to define this doctrine through its formal characteristics. 
2.1 The Doctrine of Limits: Freedom vs. Coercion
“The aim, therefore, of patriots was to set limits to the power which the ruler 
should be suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what
they meant by liberty” (Mill: 4, my emphasis). 
In this chapter we shall explore the first two principles of liberalism. The third one 
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comes later (chapter 5), on top of the first two. 
The first two principles of classical liberalism are interrelated: they are both 
instruments against coercion. Coercion is the thing that needs to be minimized in order 
to maximize freedom. Coercion is the opposite of freedom. This enables us to 
understand classical liberalism as a doctrine whereby liberty is secured through 
submitting human action, in private and public capacity, to certain limits.
I will intersperse the analysis with quotations from many classical liberals. The danger 
of such an approach is that we lose sight of the differences between various thinkers. 
But the point is to prove that the doctrine is not the invention of any particular thinker, 
but rather a shared commitment, shared by dozens of different thinkers with different 
outlooks.
Is there such a shared doctrine? Yes. Smith called it “the system of natural liberty” 
(WoN: 533). Locke called it “the law of nature” (TTG: §222). Hayek called it the “rules 
of just conduct” (LLL: 246). They all point to pretty much the same core thing. (By the 
end of this thesis, I hope to have convinced even the skeptical reader of that.)
The existence of such a doctrine is acknowledged, although not formalized in this way, 
in, e.g. Mises's Liberalism (1929), Hayek's Constitution of Liberty (1960) & Tomasi's 
Free Market Fairness (2012). My investigation will thus follow in their footsteps.
Some people disagree that such a doctrine can be found. They may wish to note the 
"difficulty of arriving at any quite definite and widely agreed meaning of liberalism.” 
(Letwin: 80) I have tried to circumvent this by focusing on classical liberalism. 
Saastamoinen even goes as far as to argue: “The term 'liberalism' does not denote a 
unified ideology in the Western philosophical tradition.” (8) 
But, Saastamoinen himself helps to outline elements of the doctrine (22-26). He sees 
that the basic principles of liberalism include: 1) natural equality between people; 2) 
individual liberty; 3) opposition to hierarchical privileges;  and 4) opposition to all 
2 I use the standard annotation, where reference is made to the section rather than the page number. All 
sections refer to the Second Treatise, unless otherwise specified, so I have omitted Roman numerals.
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further-reaching (socialist) demands for more “substantial” freedom and equality. 
The first two points could be generalized to mean that liberalism wishes to grant people
equal liberty; and the last two that liberalism wishes to limit government. So, contrary 
to Saastamoinen's claims, his analysis actually helps support my argument! So, 
classical liberalism, despite its wide range of differences, encapsulates a doctrine of 
limits against coercion, where equal liberty is guaranteed under a limited government. 
I shall, for sure, defend a particular version of these principles in later chapters – the 
consequentialism found in Locke, Smith and Hayek – so that here we can simply focus 
on the formal, logical aspects of the doctrine. Deeper justifications will come later.  
So, the guiding hypothesis is that classical liberalism is a doctrine of limits. It limits 
human action by focusing on minimizing private and public coercion:
1) Limits on private (individual) action [PRINCIPLE 1]
2)  Limits on public (government) action.  [PRINCIPLE 2]
The background assumption, here, is that people are equally entitled to liberty (= the 
equal liberty hypothesis). People are thus equally entitled to enjoy the protection of 
these limits, which are used to draw the boundaries of private property, public space, 
coercion and freedom. Equal liberty cannot flourish without such limits.
Such a framework of freedom is equivalent to what Isaiah Berlin called “negative 
freedom”. (Berlin, 1969) For classical liberalism, negative freedom (“freedom from”) 
was always much more important than positive freedom (“freedom to”), and this 
interpretation of freedom is the one I also wish to defend in my thesis. Negative 
freedom “is involved in the answer to the question 'What is the area within which the 
subject – a person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able 
to do or be, without interference by other persons?'” (Berlin: 2) It is thus equivalent to 
setting up appropriate limits, negative borders, against coercive actions by intruders.
Aside from a few anarchists (Cf. Rothbard 1973), the majority of classical liberals do 
not think that the correct way to limit government and human action is to have no 
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government and no laws. Laws, as limits to coercive action, are necessary to maintain 
individual freedom. The most common answer is not absolute individual liberty - i.e. 
absolute anarchy - but a regime of substantial individual freedom under the rule of law.
The government is seen as an agent among others, and its reach cannot be considered 
justified unless it is constrained within certain pre-defined rules, which mark out its 
legitimate form: “[T]he essence of this emerging 'liberal' program lay in the idea that 
the purpose of the state is to protect the freedom of citizens equally. The proper way for
the state is to accomplish this goal is to limit the range of its own activities. […] The 
liberal conception of justice requires that the state restrain itself.”’ (Tomasi: 7)
There cannot be absolute freedom for individuals, either. My freedom ends where your 
property begins, and the best way to protect liberty is to institute a limited government 
(a collective coercion instrument), with which to limit and 'out-crowd' private coercion.
Private coercion cannot be eliminated without the threat of public coercion. 
In order to free people, we must restrain them. Since state power is seen as 
fundamentally coercive, it is a common liberal prejudice that the “[h]uman society 
cannot do without the apparatus of the state, but the whole of mankind's progress has 
had to be achieved against the resistance and opposition of the state and its power of 
coercion.” (Mises: 58) And since the state is seen as necessary, this leads to the crucial 
question: “How can Leviathan be chained?” (Buchanan 1975: 13)
The answer is that Leviathan is “chained” and limited by 1) protecting individual 
property rights and 2) denying the state the power of absolute sovereignty.
The government can be an instrument of freedom or an instrument of coercion – and 
often it is a bit of both. This follows from the fact that all government power is 
coercive, but some coercion actually benefits freedom, since e.g. the police and the 
courts are necessary in order to make sure that individual freedoms are respected. 
There exists a relationship of mutual support between the private sphere and the public 
sphere: “Individuals hold rights or claims vis-à-vis the enforcing agent as much as 
against other persons. The government is, itself, held strictly within the law”. 
(Buchanan 1975: 83) 
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Liberal rights are mechanisms whereby coercion is limited to minimum. The allure of 
anarchism arises from the realization that all government action is suspect, because it 
depends on coercion (as embodied in the Hobbesian notion of Leviathan, the potent 
symbol of the monopoly of violence). Unlimited anarchy, however, fails to respect 
borders, too. Free private action will lead to conflicts as long as the society lacks what 
Locke called a “common judge” (TTG: §19) that can resolve disputes.
The common judge is the coercion-wielding, people-backed government with the 
power to settle disputes and thus minimize coercion between individuals. We need rules
on how to minimize coercion, but we also need to grant one institution – the 
government – the highest (but limited) authority to exercise coercion for the benefit of 
everybody. The limits are optimized and set on such a level, “between anarchy and 
Leviathan” (Buchanan, 1975), as to minimize overall coercion.
Thus the liberal “rights” and “claims” - which are made against fellow-citizens and 
against the government (which is itself defined as the collective action of free and equal
citizens) – are claims against certain kinds of actions by people in their private and 
public roles (i.e. citizens and rulers). We shall later see (e.g. Chapter 3.1), that these 
rights are best defended on consequentialist grounds: as the best means to achieve 
certain results – namely, a society of free and equal, prosperous people, where the 
productivity of labour, land and capital is maximized, to socially beneficial results.
The majority of classical liberals (in the tradition of “negative freedom”) share a core 
belief in such a conception of limits to private and public action, which translates into 
strong property rights under a limited government. This is the libertarian core of 
liberalism. Such a system maximizes freedom through limiting coercion. And although 
the general and long-term outcomes of such a system are assumed to be positive, there 
is, in this minimal conception, very little concern for the particular and short-term 
outcomes of such a system. Thus, liberalism has a strong bias towards procedural, non-
patterned justice, where “[t]he 'goodness' of an outcome is evaluated on procedural 
criteria” (Buchanan 1975: 164), and where “[p]atterns of distribution within the social 
world are not a reflection of anyone's intention or design, but emerge as the unplanned 
and ever-changing product of choices individuals make in pursuit of their goals and 
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ends.” (Tomasi: 10) 
Rights-based liberals, like Locke3 and Rothbard, argue that the limits set by liberalism 
are necessary since they derive from innate human rights – usually granted by God, 
Nature or Reason. Consequentialist liberals, like Smith or Hayek, argue that the goal of 
the limits set by liberalism is to enable a free and prosperous society. In both cases, the 
method is enforcing sufficient limits on action: not too much and not too little.
Debate within liberalism is largely debate about the precise contours of these limits. 
There are considerable differences in the way different thinkers approach these 
questions. Disputes about the precise nature of limits is largely debates about the 
meaning of freedom and coercion; and especially on disagreements on “the part I 
believe to be played by other human beings, directly or indirectly, with or without the 
intention of doing so, in frustrating my wishes. By being free in this sense I mean not 
being interfered with by others. The wider the area of non-interference the wider my 
freedom.” (Berlin: 3) Such disputes result in different views on what counts as 
coercion. For example, welfare-leaning liberals will argue that all sorts of 'voluntary' 
contracts (say between a poor worker and a rich corporation) may be coercive in the 
wider sense, while libertarian-leaning liberals will be more reluctant to say so. (Cf. 
Hayek, CoL: 198) I am operating under the latter, stricter, definition of coercion. You 
see, definitions of limits also require, well, definite limits, and the looser notion of 
coercion threatens to nullify the possibility of demarcating clear boundaries.
The purpose of my analysis is to show the usefulness and beneficience of these limits. 
Despite my respect for property rights, I fall in line with the consequentialist camp. I 
want to argue that even “natural” rights need consequentialist justifications of their 
beneficial social effects, of the sort that Locke, Smith and Hayek do, in fact, provide.
But the crucial thing to recognize, here, is the extent to which the paradigm is shared 
within the Lockean-Hayekian classical liberal tradition. Both rights-based and 
consequentialist liberals converge, more or less, on the idea of freedom from coercion 
being defined negatively as limits. Thus we can say that, indeed, there does exist a 
3 Although, I aim to show that even the apparently rights-based approach of Lockeanism is actually, in 
important ways, best understood as a consequentialist theory about the usefulness of rules.
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coherent doctrine of limits in classical liberalism.
The two principles are, to recap: 1) Freedom from private coercion (strong property 
rights); and 2) Freedom from public coercion (limits to government power).
Let us now take a look at how private property is necessary for negative freedom.
2.2 Property Rights: Freedom from Private Coercion 
“[G]overnment has no other end but the preservation of property” (TTG: §94).
The philosophical understanding of the notion of property is often muddled by the 
seemingly simple nature of the concept. Property is, surely, what makes the difference 
between what is mine and what is yours. But what, exactly, does this mean?
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1754) provides a powerful critique of private property in his 
essay On the Origin of the Inequality of Mankind4: “The first person who, having 
enclosed a plot of land, took it into his head to say this is mine and found people simple
enough to believe him was the true founder of civil society. […] "Do not listen to this 
imposter. You are lost if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to all and the earth 
to no one!” (Part Two, opening words.)
The classical liberals obviously take a more positive approach. Property, for them, is an
important institution - at least up to a point. They argue that property is beneficent and 
benevolent. In the following, I wish to bring about an understanding of property 
(rights) as limits on human action. Nozick calls them “side-constraints” (Nozick: 32) 
on human action. In later chapters, I shall quarrel with Nozick's demarcation of these 
limits, but his terminology is very useful. We need constraints to protect the autonomy 
of the individual (and her private sphere) from external transgressions. Property, in the 
classical liberal sense, is the creation of a protected private sphere surrounded by limits 
that cannot be crossed without ethical transgression.  As Nozick put it in the opening 
words of his Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974): “Individuals have rights, and there are 
4 Online edition, no page numbers.
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things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights).” (ix)
Thus, you may not enter my house without my permission. Thus, you may not borrow 
my car without my permission. Thus, you may not violate my body. In this sense, 
property is the legal limit on human action: my claim against others, recognized by 
society. Property rights mark the limits of permitted action in a liberal society. 
Locke considered property rights to consist of “life, liberty, and estate” (TTG: §87). 
Government ought to “to preserve [a citizen’s] property – that is, his life, liberty, and 
estate – against the injuries and attempts of other men”. (ibid.) Property is a safeguard 
of “my domain”, which consists of robust self- and property-ownership. One is 
(mostly) free to do whatever does not infringe upon the the like property of another, i.e.
trespass the legally defined limits of another person's private sphere.
Communist critics (correctly) saw private property as a limitation on the actions of 
people. That it is. But they (incorrectly) concluded that a better society is possible 
without such limits. People like Rousseau wish to eliminate private property because 
they fail to see that “private property is not a privilege of the property owner, but a 
social institution for the good and benefit for all.” (Mises: 30) This consequentialist 
argument for a strong notion of property I shall defend in this essay.
This, of course, does not mean that property rights should be absolute. The specific 
nature of property rights is up for deliberation. James Buchanan (1975) writes: “Neither
the specific distribution of rights among separate persons, nor the general characteristic 
of the rights structure itself is relevant directly to the issue of mutual agreement, 
certainty in definition, and enforcement.” (ibid: 21) It only matters that they be “well-
defined and non-arbitrary” (ibid: 18). Although this can't be quite true, either: a well-
defined and non-arbitrary form of communism might not be quite as beneficial.
A regime of legally protected property rights is a prerequisite for liberty: “the end of the
law is, not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom. For […] where 
there is no law there is no freedom” (TTG: §57). Without property rights, there would 
be no “general, abstract rules” (Hayek, CoL: 72) that are “well-defined and non-
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arbitrary” (Buchanan: ibid.). They alone make the security and liberty of civilized life 
possible. Social cooperation without private property rights, and the security they bring,
would almost certainly be less productive. Some liberals even claim, as a result, that 
“society can continue to exist only on the foundation of private property.” (Mises: 87)5
This is certainly true of the commercial society. Property rights have made human life 
free of the arbitrary and fickle will of other people, and of the arbitrary and fickle will 
of the government, by giving birth to the protected private sphere. Property is the 
prerequisite of a society in which people can trust each other to develop peaceful 
coordination for their mutual benefit. Hayek even went as far as to say: “The possibility
of men living together in peace and to their mutual advantage without having to agree 
on common concrete aims, and bound only by abstract rules of conduct, was perhaps 
the greatest discovery mankind ever made.” (Hayek, LLL: 294) It is hard to prove such 
a point. But the great productive capacity of capitalism certainly suggests that private 
property has been instrumental in allowing for the developments of modernity. Such 
private property can be defended on consequentialist grounds as vital to the kind of 
civilization in which we live (and to the kind of society that might yet emerge).
Commercial civilization begins with the protection of property, but it needs laws to 
function. Let us now look at the element of government in this equation.
 
      2.3 Limited Government: Freedom from Public Coercion 
“[W]here there is no law there is no freedom”. (Locke, TTG: §57)
Limited government, of course, is an ambiguous term. All governments have limits, 
even the most tyrannical. (Even Hitler was theoretically kept in check by the Volk.)
But I claim that the liberal program is the only political philosophy where the question 
of devising mechanisms of limiting governmental power is the core methodological 
question. 
5 To counter Rousseau's criticism, Mises might retort: 'But do you wish to destroy civilization?' To which
Rousseau might reply: 'Yes! If by civilization you mean the chains of society.'
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The importance of the government, and of its limitations, follows logically from 
property rights. Friedrich Hayek, in his classic work, Constitution of Liberty (1960), 
writes that "[t]he recognition of private or several property is [...] an essential condition 
for the prevention of coercion [because it is] the first step in the delimitation of the 
private sphere which protects us against coercion.” (Hayek: 205) Where private 
property is secure, to quote Locke, "being all equal and independent, no one ought to 
harm another in his life, health, liberty and possessions." (TTG: §6) To establish and 
maintain property rights, we need a government to enforce security. But the 
government should limit itself, so that it doesn't become an agent of excessive coercion.
Another way of looking at the liberal project is to say that liberals want certainty in the 
government enforcement of well-defined property rights, but tolerate (high levels of) 
uncertainty in the resulting distributional pattern of people's private economic fortunes: 
”Within the writings of Locke and Smith and others in their school, a new ideal of 
social order appears in the political imagination of the West: an order of law-governed 
flux. Under this ideal, a central task of government is to provide a secure set of laws 
protecting property and exchange, laws equally applicable to all and known in advance 
to be more or less fixed. Within the stable frame of strong but limited government, 
however, all else is change.” (Tomasi: 10) These principles are a blueprint for the 
limited government, and, as I shall argue (Ch. 5), for the limited welfare state.
The limited government is not a government without power, but a government with 
limited power. It is compatible with democratic, majoritarian and even welfare 
functions. But it is not compatible with intrusively paternalistic government control of 
the private lives of citizens. This was made most clearly in J.S.Mill's classic book, On 
Liberty (1859): “The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle” (which 
encompasses, in my scheme, the first two principles): “that the sole end for which 
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of 
action of any of their number, is self-protection. [= Principle 1] That the only purpose 
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. [= Principle 2] His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.” (Mill: 17)6 This is, again, like Smith's 
6 Although we should point out that Mill himself, especially in his later years, was quite willing to 
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“system of natural liberty” (WoN: 533), a good formulation of the Three Principles.
Too much government intervention is a bad thing, because it inhibits the spontaneous 
and non-coerced development of society. There are no predetermined limits to the 
development and variety of such a society. With a minimum of rules, a maximum of 
diversity is allowed. So, paradoxically enough, the limitations, by reducing risk, 
increase risk-taking and productive experimentation.
The flipside is that the liberal society must be neutral as regards the particular ends and 
economic choices in the society. Nozick, for example, explains that the libertarian side-
constraints “specify an ongoing process, without fixing how it is to turn out, without 
providing some external patterned criterion it must meet." (Nozick: 207) Such an order 
of a free society is, to be sure, somewhat chaotic and unpredictable, but, under the 
property rights of the limited government, there emerges a “spontaneous order” (Hayek,
CoL: passim) of “law-governed flux” (Tomasi: 10) conducive to “ordered anarchy” 
(Buchanan 1975: 18). All these technical-sounding terms actually refer to a very simple
thing: with a minimum of rules, a maximum of beneficial outcomes develops, as 
individual humans improve their own lives. Limited government enables freedom, 
which, in turn, makes society more productive, prosperous and progressive.
Laws are limits that foster liberty. Classical liberal thinkers across the ages, despite 
multiple differences and many deviations, share, for the most part, a long-lasting 
methodological commitment to the notion of maximally limited government and 
maximally free individual action. 
Across its variations, classical liberalism is usually not a theory of what should be done 
by people and governments (in order to achieve various objectives), but of what should
not be done by people and governments (in order to allow for open-ended free choice). 
It is a doctrine of negative freedom, i.e. of setting up limits to coercive actions, in order 
to foster the peaceful coordination of the free actions of individuals. A regime of 
limited laws maximizes peaceful actions and reduces coercive actions to a minimum:
“The coercion which the government must still use for this end [of preventing 
sacrifice many of the principles of economic liberalism for other utilitarian ends.
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people violating others’ rights] is reduced to a minimum and made as innocuous
as possible by restraining it through known general rules, so that in most 
instances the individual need never be coerced unless he has placed himself in a 
position where he knows he will be coerced. Even where coercion is not 
avoidable, it is deprived of its most harmful effects by being confined to limited 
and foreseeable duties, or at least made independent of the arbitrary will of 
another person.” (Hayek, CoL: 72) 
Coercion is minimized, via organized coercion, under the rule of law. But, due to its 
theoretical, abstract and general nature, liberal doctrine does not offer simple solutions 
to concrete questions regarding legislative minutiae. Major disagreements may and do 
arise as to what kind of a regime of laws and regulations exactly fits these abstract ideal
limits (to private and public action).
What sets the classical liberal apart from socialists, and also many welfare liberals, is 
not the anarchist desire to minimize the state, nor the selfish desire to maximize the 
freedom of individuals, but the civil and political desire to maximize peaceful, 
voluntary cooperation, and economic prosperity, via the doctrine of the limits – 
consisting of a limited government and well-defined property rights.
The ultimate aim of the classical liberal program is a free society balanced between 
anarchy and Leviathan. The “ideal society is anarchy, in which no one man or group of 
men coerce another,” (Buchanan 1975: 92) but unfortunately this is impracticable, since
“each person seeks mastery over a world of slaves.” (ibid.) Thus Leviathan is 
unavoidable - but we must chain the beast. 
2.4 Recapitulation: Limits as Safeguards of  Freedom
According to classical liberalism, government is a tool for protecting property rights of 
individuals, and thus of safeguarding human liberty. The government should do all it 
must (within its constitutional limits) to uphold a set of limits on coercive action – but 
not any more than that. The challenge, to quote Milton Friedman (1962), is the 
following: “How can we keep the government we create from becoming a Frankenstein
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that will destroy the very freedom we establish it to protect?” (10)
Thus, to sum up:
1. The regime of private property is a) a positive program of granting individuals 
(through the dividing line between “mine and thine”) the monopolistic power to 
act autonomously within their own sphere, and of exchanging goods, and 
agreeing to voluntary contracts, with other property holders; and b) a negative 
program of depriving other individuals (and the state) powers of action beyond 
those limits. Any such violations, transgressions, will be punished by the state. 
2. The limited government is a) a positive program of granting the state (through 
the establishment of political institutions) the monopolistic power to set up 
binding formal positive rules within its borders, and b) a negative program of 
depriving the state of illegitimate powers of expansion beyond those limits.
All classical liberals emphasize, in different ways, limited government and private 
property rights, as justifiable ethical restrictions on (state and human) action. But their 
differences, in the details, highlight some of the major disagreements of the proper end 
and extent of these limits. Is a classical liberal state compatible with the compulsory 
state education of children? Or publicly funded health services? What about 
environmental regulation? (I will argue, in Chapter 5, that yes, quite possibly, within 
limits.) Classical liberalism does not grant easy answers to these questions.
And although it is hard to accept the notion that all social democratic interventions into 
the economy constitute first steps on a “road to serfdom” (Cf. Hayek, 1944), or that we 
are faced with the black-and-white choice of “either private ownership of the means of 
production, or hunger and misery for everyone,” (Mises: 88) it is nonetheless plausible 
that the ethical doctrine of limits encapsulated by the classical liberal program contains 
a coherent and logical consequentialist doctrine against an excessive government.
The justification of such a doctrine lies in its capacity to produce beneficial outcomes 
on the macro-level, of rules and institutions, economies and cultures. The institution of 
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fixed rules does not guarantee optimal immediate or local results. But it is precisely 
because its long-term and large-scale benefits are so great that we should try to restrain 
from interfering in the particular and immediate cases. The slight local benefit we gain 
may come at the expense of a global disintegration of the system as a whole:
“Public utility requires that property should be regulated by general inflexible 
rules; and though such rules are adopted as best serve the same end of public 
utility, it is impossible for them to prevent all particular hardships, or make 
beneficial consequences result from every individual case.” (Hume, 1777: §257)
The classical liberal doctrine of limits is a very powerful set of rules to guide human 
action to prosperity without too much hand-holding. After setting a few firm limits on 
private and public coercion, the classical liberal doctrine lets the system runs its natural 
course. John Gray comments: “[T]he usefulness of the whole system depends on it not 
being continuously threatened by utilitarian calculation. [W]e protect our interests and 
promote our welfare as best as we can, not by by treating the rules of justice as at any 
moment defeasible by reference to private or public welfare, but precisely by treating 
them as almost invulnerable to such overthrow or abridgement.” (Gray: 124)
So, we should institute a strong, quasi-libertarian regime of boundaries between people 
and their property holdings to create a system where people can use their own 
capacities, knowledge, propensities and desires in a way that is most likely to create 
socially beneficial outcomes. Thus strong property rights must be a part of the limited 
welfare state that I am advocating (See: Chapters 5-6). To quote Mises: ”Private 
property creates for the individual a sphere in which he is free of the state.” (67) 
Without such a sphere, it is difficult to coordinate the conflicting actions of individuals. 
The usefulness of fixed principles in advancing “public utility” (Hume: §257) becomes 
clear. Private property enables the sort of social cooperation that is conducive to 
enlargement of the opportunities for all citizens, in the long run. The benefits of the 
limits set by classical liberalism come from their overall long-term effects.
An understanding of liberalism as a doctrine of limits makes it possible to criticize 
liberalism as a doctrine that imposes restrictions on human action in very significant 
ways, even while it claims to free human beings from the bondages of tyranny and 
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violence. Freedom is only possible with(in) limits, restraints, borders, laws and, yes, 
police protection. These limits constrain human action, and government action, in 
significant ways. From this context is is also possible to sympathize with Rousseau's 
critique (1754). But I claim that the public utility of these restrictions far outweighs the 
negatives – especially if we complement the institution of thick private property rights 
with a limited range of public programs and a guaranteed social safety net.
2.5 The Limited Welfare State: Where Does It Come From?
So what about the third principle? It arises on top of these two principles. This means 
that the limited government can incorporate a framework of limited government 
programs for general welfare and the public good. I shall look in depth at such a limited
welfare state in Chapter 5. But how can we support both liberty and welfare? This 
seems to be a paradox. Are they not quite unrelated concerns?
“Classical liberals often do a poor job explaining why the liberal state can levy 
taxes to support social services. In defending 'interventionist' programs such as 
these, classical liberals sometimes invoke consequentialist values, such as the 
need to prevent social strife and thus maintain economic efficiency. But 
defended on that basis, it then becomes unclear why those interventions, but not 
others, are justifiable. At other times classical liberals advert to non-
consequentialist concerns – such as natural duties of charity, or intuitively 
grounded obligations of beneficience – in an attempt to hold together the 
various parts of their view.” (Tomasi: 47)
I shall acknowledge the difficulty of drawing precise limits on government power based
on  purely  consequentialist  arguments.  Rights-based  approaches,  especially  of  the
libertarian hardcore variety, have the benefit of drawing precise boundaries, such as the
Nozickean side-constraints.  But  this  should  not  distract  us.  Who said  that  drawing
boundaries was supposed to be easy?  We can draw the general outlines, but the rules
can be always improved, as our knowledge increases, and as the culture changes.
From Lockean, Smithean and Hayekian arguments, we can draw the conclusion that,
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yes,  strong  property  rights  have  strong  consequentialist  justifications;  and  yes,  the
government must have strict limits for the very same reason. But thinking about the
beneficial and harmful effects of policies, rules and institutions also easily leads to the
acceptance, as I shall show later, of various government interventions.
It  is  important  to  keep John Gray's,  and David  Hume's,  warnings  in  mind:  “[T]he
usefulness of the whole system depends on it  not being continuously threatened by
utilitarian calculation.” (Gray: 124) Thus the welfare interventions should take a long-
term view.  Local  and immediate  micromanagement  is  incompatible  with  the  Three
Principles. But global and institution-level Pareto-improvements are quite acceptable.
The first two principles of liberalism can be justified because of their long-term and
macro-level beneficial effects. The same logic allows us to justify a range of public
interventions that improve the institutional framework and rule-structure of the society,
without micromanaging citizens' lives. Public education, environmental protection, and
a social safety net might be examples of such interventions. I will make the claim that
such a utopian framework is a strong contender to the utopias of Nozick and Marx.
But  first,  let  me  turn  our  attention  to  John  Locke  who  perfectly  encapsulates  the
doctrine of limits and the Three Principles. He provides a combination of rights-based
and consequentialist arguments in favour of them. Especially the latter, I claim, offer a
good basis for defending the Three Principles of Liberalism and the Two Principles of
Libertarianism. Later, a hardcore interpretation of them needs to be rejected, in order to
develop further the welfare provisions that his “Proviso(s)” tentatively make possible.
3. John Locke: The Foundations of Classical Liberalism
Why Locke? For two reasons: 1) His influence was huge in the classical liberal 
tradition. 2) He provided succinct formulations of the Three Principles. Let us analyse 
the Two Treatises of Government. I will be focusing mostly on the 2nd Treatise.
3.1 Locke on Principle 1: Private Property
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Locke, in his Two Treatises of Government (1689), laid the foundations of private 
property for modern liberal philosophy. He showed its essential relationship to liberty 
and good governance. And although he did not invent the phrase "life, liberty and 
property" (and its many variations), he popularized and systematized it, based on the 
liberal thinking of the Whigs and the radicals. 
He followed the "natural law" tradition, according to which there are laws that are 
independent of government power. However, it is not necessary for us to delve deeper 
into the natural law tradition. All we need to know, here, is that natural law is basically 
another name for the Three Principles of Liberty. It provides rational grounds (both 
rights-based and consequentialist) for the acceptance of property rights. The law of 
nature sets limits to action, in the form of proto-property rights, even before the 
institution of government:.
"The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges 
everyone; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but 
consult it, that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm 
another in his life, health, liberty and possessions." (TTG: §6, my 
emphasis)
The equality and independence of people, even before any laws, means that people 
should not steal, rob, rape, attack or otherwise harm other people.
The first principle involves the demarcation of the institution of private property. In as 
many as five different sections in the 2nd Treatise, Locke writes that the chief aim of 
government is the “preservation of property”. (TTG: §85, §94, §138, §226, §239) 
The establishment of such limits against private coercion – the protection of the private 
sphere via the establishment of limits on what one person may do to another - derives 
from the self-interested actions of individuals in the state of anarchy. It is a principle all
rational beings will accept. The, here, argument is essentially a combination of a priori 
rationalism, social contract theory, and rule-consequentialism. It is especially the last – 
rule-consequentialism – that I want to focus on.
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The rules of private property – the limits of freedom – are social institutions. There are 
strong consequentialist arguments for their existence. Locke argues that private 
property is necessary in order to increase the productivity of the land, and thus increase 
the wealth of the society. He estimates that somewhere between 90% (§40), 99% (ibid.)
or even 99.9% (TTG: §43) of the value of land and natural resources is due to labour 
exerted on it.  As Locke repeatedly says, cultivated land far outvalues uncultivated 
common land. Land left uncultivated and commonly owned would be "possible not 
worth a penny" or "at least, I may truly say, not one-thousandth" compared to the value 
of an equal plot privately managed for gain and profit. (§43) Thus nature, before the 
attachment of productive labour upon it, in its raw state, has very little capacity of 
fulfilling man's needs. A wild berry field cannot compete with a cultivated field. 
Without private property, the value of natural resources would remain underdeveloped.
Private property is an instrument of wealth-creation that turns a wasteland into a 
flourishing civilization. Before the invention of money and private industry,"all the 
world was America": as was the case in the beginning of the world. (TTG: §49) Only 
labour, industry and exchange turned uncultivated wilderness into bountiful goods and 
property, because "land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of 
pastural, tillage or planting, is called, as indeed it is, a waste, and we shall find the 
benefit of it amount to little more than nothing." (TTG: §42) Pre-laboured nature is 
practically valueless and it would be "a waste" to leave it untouched and unowned.
Private property is the fate of mankind: "God and his reason commanded him to subdue
the earth" (§39) and, in each case, "labour put a distinction between [private] and 
common" (§28). Thus, although "God gave the world to men in common” (§34), he 
also allowed the industrious and the rational to make the most use of it: "He gave it to 
the use of the industrious and the rational (and labour was to be his title to it)" (ibid.). 
This happens by natural justice, since the industrious and the rational, due to their 
higher productivity, are capable of creating more wealth than the rest of mankind. This 
source of inequality is not a violation of justice, a) since such inequality is produced 
without hurting anybody else's rights, and b) since it actually benefits the whole society.
Although the Earth's fruits and riches were, indeed, given "to mankind in common" 
(§30), private ownership is necessary to improve it, and to actually enjoy nature's 
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offerings. The common stock of natural resources must be revoked and turned into 
private property "before it can do any good for the support of [man's] life" (ibid.), i.e. 
before the riches common to all can be put to any actual use. Thus the fate of the people
in the “original communism” is bleak. They shall always remain poor and stagnant.
This gives rise to Locke's labour theory of property: "[E]very man has a property in his 
own person; this nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his body and the 
work of his hands we may say are properly his." (§27) Private property arises as an 
extension of one's labour productivity: "Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state 
that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined it to 
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property." (ibid., my emphasis) 
This is called the “labour-mixing” theory of property. It gives rise to just claims to 
property, but only within the confines of the so-called Proviso: "...at least where there is
enough and as good left in common for others." (§27) This means that there must an 
equal opportunity for everybody. But as long as the Proviso is respected, private 
property should not be seen as lessening the chances of poor people, since “he who 
appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen but increase the common 
stock of mankind”. (§37) In modern terms, there occurs a Pareto-improvement.7
So, Locke is ultimately justifying the natural right of original appropriation on 
consequentialist grounds. Or rather, rights are thus sanctified. The extreme productivity 
of private possessions is beneficial to all mankind, and it allows people to divide the 
world's resources amongst themselves productively. Yes, it allows some people to get 
richer, but the wealth thus created will be shared in the market system; and it is the 
justified result of the use of the differing talents of individuals from an equal and free 
starting position. The result is a distribution of land and private property according to 
labour productivity: "God, by commanding to subdue [nature], gave authority so far to 
appropriate [property]. And the condition of human life, which requires labour and 
materials to work on, necessarily introduces private possessions." (§35) 
However, this does not justify unlimited hoarding of possessions. Aside from the 
7 Pareto-improvement takes place whenever a change in the system benefits everybody. Note that the 
distribution of the benefits does not have to be equal to count as a Pareto-improvement.
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“enough and as good left in common” -proviso, the right to property is also limited by 
the lesser-known 'spoilage' proviso. According to it, one is entitled to the full fruit of 
his or her labour only if he or she puts it to good use (i.e. consumes, sells or gives away 
the product thus created). Anything beyond this is a misuse of private property: 
“The same law of nature that does by this means give us property does also 
bound that property, too. ‘God has given us all things richly’ (I Tim. 6.17), is the
voice of reason confirmed by inspiration. But how far has he given it to us? To 
enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it 
spoils, so much may he by his labor fix a property in; whatever is beyond this is 
more than his share and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to
spoil or destroy.” (TTG: §31)
Since private property derives its justification from its capacity to increase the overall 
wealth of society, this obliges the property owner not to waste his production 
capacities. This Proviso makes sense if we understand its utilitarian basis:
1. Private property is justified if it “increases the common stock of mankind”
2. Spoiling or destroying property decreases the common stock of mankind.
3. Therefore, spoiling or destroying property is not justified.
These two provisos create important boundary conditions to property. If they are 
violated – as we must assume they often are – then property rights are not absolute. 
And this, indeed, is the reading of Locke that I want to defend.
Locke's idea of a free and equal starting position, where people can go appropriate land 
for themselves, does not really apply to today's situation. Thus land ownership becomes
a monopoly on a scarce resource, as later thinkers like Adam Smith (1776) and Henry 
George (1879) have argued. It is arguable that land ownership always violates free 
markets and needs to be compensated. In Lockean terms, property, where there is not 
“enough and as good left in common for others” (§27) violates natural justice. The law 
of nature, let me remind the reader, means the Three Principles. Thus violations of the 
proviso(s) are violations of Principle 3. The Provisos are examples of Principle 3.
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Thus, even if we convince ourselves that "men have agreed to a disproportionate and 
unequal possession of the earth" (§45), the situation needs to be compensated to those 
who do not have “enough and as good left in common” for them. This fact might imply 
a systematic system of taxation and redistribution.
Locke freely mixes consequentialist arguments – about the productivity of private 
property – with strict rights-based arguments – about how God gave men title to the 
land. Thus it fails to make clear what the “ultimate” moral foundations of property are. 
This causes ambiguity, because his theory of the origins of property can be read in a 
rights-based libertarian way (Nozick) or in a consequentialist way (the author). 
However, here we only need to be aware of a few things: 1) Locke was very influential.
Today, a defence of private property must begin with Locke. 2) TTG encapsulates 
perfectly the First Principle of Liberalism. Locke stated it quite clearly: The 
“government has no other end but the preservation of property” (§94). 3) His 
consequentialist defence of property will support our main argument in the thesis, that 
property rights and limited government are justified because they are productive 
institutions that increase “the common stock of mankind” (§37); and 4) The boundary 
conditions – Provisos – that he places on property justify a non-libertarian reading of 
Locke (which can even help to justify the limited welfare state).
3.2 Locke on Principle 2: Limited Government
“The end of the law is, not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge 
freedom.” (TTG: §57)
With these words, Locke defends the second principle of liberalism: the limited 
government. It is an argument against anarchism and tyranny. Of course he is not being 
entirely honest here. When he says that law preserves freedom, he downplays the fact 
that it does, of course, at the same time, put restraints on people. But he wants to 
emphasize that these restraints have a beneficial social utility: they reduce overall 
coercion in the society. Freedom benefits from such targeted restraints. (Assuming we 
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are still talking about good laws.) The ideal government puts limits on thieves, 
libertines and anarchists. I shall quote the section at length here:
“For in all the states of created beings capable of laws, where there is no law 
there is no freedom. For liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from 
others; which cannot be where there is no law and is not, as we are told, a 
liberty for every man to do what he lists. (For who could be free when every 
other man's humour might domineer over him?) But a liberty to dispose, and 
order as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole property, within
the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be the subject 
of the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.” (§57)
Since people are free and equal, one man's liberty is another's coercion: 1) If A does 
“what he lists” there will be coercion on B. 2) A's “doing what one wants” is an 
impediment to B's liberty. 3) Therefore, liberty cannot entail “doing what one wants.” 
Let us take an example. The Biblical injunction “Thou shalt not kill” has a positive 
effect on the amount of freedom available in society. It decreases the freedom of 
individuals to kill other people; but it increases the freedom of individuals not to be 
killed. And since killing is a much worse act than the prevention of it - the act of killing
destroys the freedom of the victim absolutely - the result of the reduction of acts of 
murder is a sum-total increase in citizens' total freedom (and all the accrued benefits).8 
So we need political power. It is organized, primarily, to defend the 1st Principle:
"Political power [is the] right of making laws with penalties of death, and 
consequently also less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, 
and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws, and 
in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for 
the public good." (§3)
Thus the libertarian core of the Lockean government is a government limited to the 
protection of “life, liberty and estates” against all coercion. The requirement of liberal 
justice is to punish transgressions of this principle. It begins in the state of nature and 
8 On the other hand, there are plenty of laws which stand against freedom. The injunction against 
worshipping other gods and graven images is an example of a law that, however you look at it, is simply 
defined to reduce the worshipper's freedom (and to advance some other end: e.g. loyalty and piety).
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continues in the state of society: “He that in the state of nature would take away the 
freedom that belongs to any one in that state, must necessarily be supposed to have a 
design to take away everything else, that freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as
he that in the state of society or commonwealth, must be supposed to design to take 
away from them everything else, and so be looked on as in a state of war." (§17)
 
Locke equated natural law with educated human reason: "The state of nature has a law 
of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone; and reason, which is that law, teaches 
all mankind who will but consult it..." (§6) This means that the acceptance of the first 
principle of liberalism is a rational deduction that can be independently verified – it 
“teaches all mankind who will but consult it” (ibid.).9 
Man, in the state of nature, is “the absolute lord of his own person and possessions, 
equal to the greatest, and subject to nobody.” (§123) Nonetheless, the foreseeable and 
unforeseeable “fears and continual dangers” of such a condition of free-for-all anarchy 
make the free man “willing to join in society with others” (ibid.) for the “preservation 
of their property” (i.e. “lives, liberties, and estates”) - that being the “great and chief 
end” of all commonwealth and government. (§124)
But joining a dictatorship is no good. The limits to government power must be clearly 
demarcated in order to prevent abuses of power. According to Locke, arbitrary or 
absolute power is even worse than a state of anarchy. It is better to have no government,
with all the inconveniences of anarchy, than to have a bad, tyrannical government. 
Since men are born free (note the gender-bias10), and since the principles of justice arise
from the state of nature, voluntarily becoming the subject of a commonwealth does not 
contradict natural liberty, but is simply the logical extension of it in a civilized society:
“The obligations of the law of nature ceases not in society, but only in 
many cases are drawn closer, and have by human laws known 
9    I dare even claim that the arguments of reason are consequentialist as far as they show the bad     
consequences of acting out of stupidity. One learns to be rational by bumping into obstacles.
10 It is not only a grammatical curiosity of 17th century parlance that “man” stood for the whole of 
“mankind.” This fact also reveals a systematic underestimation, or even denial, of the freedom and 
capacities of women. A society of free humans was literally a society of men, from which women 
were excluded, and pushed into the private realm.
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penalties annexed to them to enforce their observation. Thus the law of 
nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others.” 
(§135)
     
What the “law of nature” obliges is respect for the limits of property. As I have stated, 
the “law of nature” is essentially a defence of the Three Principles. The first principle 
grounds morality; morality grounds the second principle; which, in turn, grounds 
politics. The second principle, in fact, is a natural corollary to the first. It almost follows
transitively from it. There is no separate justification for the limited government. Its 
justification derives entirely from that of property, since it acts as the latter's guardian.
The security that the commonwealth provides does come at the cost of some liberty, 
namely the liberty to coerce others, to pay no taxes, and to enact private justice. But the
security it provides is compatible with the maximum amount of liberty and happiness 
(utility etc.) for the society, and even for oneself as a rational agent. Contra Hobbes, law
increases overall liberty, and reduces overall coercion, by making sure that violations of
liberty are persecuted to the fullest. Far from people alienating their powers to a 
sovereign Leviathan - with an autonomous will – the people continue to be the 
inalienable source of sovereignty. They retain their innate rights11. They merely transfer
a limited amount of their own power to the government for increased protection.
The best form of government that suggests itself to Locke is the republican 
commonwealth of limited government, centred on parliamentary decision-making 
checked by the natural liberty of citizens. "I easily grant that civil government is the 
proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature” (§13). Because freedom is 
the protection of certain limits, there is more freedom under a limited government, 
which can protect those limits, than under no government, or under a tyranny.
"The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth,
and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have 
only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man in society is to be 
under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the 
11All this rights-talk is far from the consequentialism that I am advocating. And indeed, these are 
precisely the sort of passages that libertarianism derives from. But we should remember that all these 
rights have consequentialist justifications attached to them, even if they are not always obvious.
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commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will or constraint of any 
law, but what that legislative shall enact according to the trust put in it." 
(§22)
Lockean democracy starts with safeguarding libertarian principles. The Lockean 
parliament has (limited but pertinent) taxation and levying powers. These are justified 
by the needs of the state to uphold the rights of its citizens. The minimal requirements 
of the state are equivalent to the the 'minimal state': police, army, justice system, etc. 
This is the libertarian minimal state. The classical liberal doctrine, as I have argued, 
necessarily has the minimal state as its “libertarian core” (which defends the first two 
interrelated principles of liberalism). So it is with Locke. But there is more to it.
Let us now explore how the Lockean limited government co-exists with welfare.
3.3 Locke on Principle 3: The Limited Welfare State
Locke's arguments for the more-than-minimal functions of government can be divided 
into three parts: 1) The argument from the Proviso(s). 2) The argument from Charity. 3)
The argument from Democracy. They all converge towards the acceptance of the 
limited welfare functions of Principle 3. Their basis, like the basis of the rest of Locke's
theory, is a hodgepodge of consequentialist, rights-based and social contract arguments.
I wish to defend a consequentialist reading. Let us look at the three arguments:
A) The argument from the Proviso(s). We have already discussed these.
B) The argument from Charity. Locke believed that private property was the bedrock
of society. However, it is sometimes not enough: 
“[It] would always be a Sin in any Man of Estate, to let his Brother perish for 
want of affording him Relief out of his Plenty. As Justice gives ever Man a Title 
to the product of his honest Industry, and the fair Acquisitions of his Ancestors 
descended to him; so Charity gives every Man a Title to so much out of 
another's Plenty, as will keep him from extream want, where he has no means to
subsist otherwise.” (TTG; I, §42, my emphasis)
The primary function of government, for Locke, is the protection of the natural rights of
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the people. This has often been equated with the protection of property rights, and for a 
good cause. But since people also have a natural right to basic subsistence - “Charity 
gives every Man a Title” - the government should also protect the people against  
“extream want” [sic]. This principle is the third principle of liberalism. Private property
and the limited government must also accept Charity12. And while he doesn't explicitly 
say it, this, in fact, constitutes a defence of a governmental assistance for poor people to
meet their basic subsistence. The “extream want” [sic] of poor people justifies, does it 
not, the implementation of a social safety net:
“God hath not left one man so to the mercy of another, […] but that he has given his 
needy brother a right to the surplusage of his good” (ibid.) 
He believed that Principles 1 and 2 must be complemented with Principle 3. So Locke, 
the favourite of hardcore libertarians, was more of a “bleeding-heart.” In speaking of a 
“right” and a “title”, he is opening the possibility of a classical liberal welfare state. 
This theory is compatible with a compulsory redistributive scheme. (See Chapter XX.) 
Let us keep this in mind when we explore the libertarian readings of Locke.
C) The argument from Democracy. Locke was an eager parliamentarian. To the 
chagrin of many readers, the powers of Lockean parliamentary rule are not limited to a 
libertarian observance of the core property rights. He allowed for democratic legislation
– even, in some cases, in direct contradiction to liberty. His ideal commonwealth can be
read as a limited welfare state. (Its vagueness allows for libertarian and social 
democratic interpretations, too.)
He writes, recall, that “the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators 
as well as others.” (§135). The primary use of the law of nature is the protection of 
property. Thus “the chief end [of] government is the preservation of their property” 
(§124) But Locke also says that all the force of the state is “to be directed to no other 
end but the peace, safety and public good of the people.” (§131) Now, the “preservation
of property” and “the peace, safety and public good of the people” are not exactly the 
same thing. (At least not necessarily.) And indeed, his statement that “property is to be 
regulated by the laws of the society” (§120) complicates this even further. In defence of
12 Charity, here, means Christian love – not charity as opposed to government welfare.
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property, one can justify one set of actions. In defence of the public good, one can 
justify another set of actions. Sometimes they overlap; but sometimes they are in hard 
conflict.
Taxation for the purpose of the protection of property rights is obviously justified. It  
does not violate of property rights, because it is necessary for their protection. A certain
amount of restraint on the absolute use of property is necessary in order to protect the 
institution of private property itself. This is what Hayek (1978) meant with the 
statement that “[f]reedom has been made possible by the restraint on freedom.”13 
The need for common taxation, the provision of the army and the police, and the 
upkeep of the machinery of justice, even before we go beyond the minimal state, 
require non-absolute property rights. But these property rights can be further curtailed 
in other ways. The “public good” argument, together with his democratic zeal, lead to 
difficulties. Sometimes Locke writes as if he believed that the legislative acts of the 
parliament were, in effect, willed by the totality of the population (stemming from the 
original social contract), even if individual members disagreed with individual laws, or 
majority votes, in particular cases. Here, he is closer to Rousseau than Nozick. 
In other words, a majority vote becomes, in Locke’s scheme, universally binding, 
because one must submit to the will of the majority. The limits of one's freedom are 
partially determined by the outcomes of majority vote in a parliamentary decision 
making process. This is a problem for libertarians. Obviously the powers enacted to the 
legislative bodies are not unlimited, but they can be quite substantial.
The voluntary nature of the whole enterprise is put to question. Some statements give 
false hope: “The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property 
without his own consent.” (§138) I say false hope, because the republican nature of the 
consent becomes obvious later on. In fact, what Locke counts as consent turns out to be
simply acquiescence to majority rule: the obeying of the laws “must be with his own 
consent, i.e., the consent of the majority”. [sic!] (§140, my emphases)
Such statements form the strongest basis for a socialist reading of Locke as an 
13  From the transcript of the Bob Chitester video interview, part one, (1978), at 45'40''. 
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unlimited democrat. They form a challenge to the libertarian reading of Locke. For the 
“bleeding-heart libertarian” reading that I am advocating, they are a mixed bag. On the 
one hand, the defence of democratic procedures is necessary for any limited welfare 
state. On the other hand, Locke here opens the door dangerously close to democratic 
absolutism and the legal oppression of citizens. And it is precisely this unlimited nature 
of democracy that classical liberals in the 19th Century fought against.
So let us now turn to the development of 19th Century classical liberalism and the birth 
of libertarianism. They gave up on the 3rd Principle while solidifying the first two. From
the Three Principles of Liberalism we get: the Two Principles of Libertarianism.
4. The  Two   Principles of Libertarianism: Against Welfare
There is a continuity from Locke, via 19th Century liberalism, to Nozick. By 
understanding this connection, we can trace the libertarian interpretation of Locke, and 
reject its rejection of the welfare state. Nonetheless, the core of libertarianism, within 
the bounds of the welfare Principle, remains an important part of our Liberal Utopia. 
                      4.1  The Origins of Libertarianism: From Spencer to Nozick
“A blind faith in spontaneous progress had taken hold of people's minds, 
and with the fanaticism of sectarians the most enlightened pressed 
forward for boundless and unregulated change in society.” (Polanyi :76)
The above quote refers to the popularity of classical liberal principles – especially 
economic liberalism – in the 19th century. They sought to transform society. But so did 
the welfare state, and the democratic parliament, which developed at the same time.
Most democracies, as a result of the developments of the 19th and 20th centuries, have 
adopted some welfare measures, and have done so in a way that has extended the power
of legislation beyond what classical liberals traditionally thought was proper. In order 
to defend our limited welfare state, we need to understand how it is different from the 
unlimited welfare state. 19th Century liberals provided excellent criticisms of them.
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The great classical liberals of the 19th century, Herbert Spencer in the United Kingdom, 
and Frederic Bastiat in France, raised red flags about the rise of unlimited legislation. 
In Man versus the State, Spencer14 argued, against the rising democratic tide, that ”the 
authority of a popularly-chosen body is no more to be regarded as an unlimited 
authority than the authority of a monarch; and that as true Liberalism in the past 
disputed the assumption of a monarch's unlimited authority, so true Liberalism in the 
present will dispute the assumption of unlimited parliamentary authority." Thus the 
central concern of liberalism ought to be limiting coercion, whatever its source - be it 
the divine right of the king or the vulgar right of the demos.
By the end of the 19th Century, as Polanyi writes: “Inside and outside England, from 
Macauley to Mises, from Spencer to Sumner, there was not a militant liberal who did 
not express his conviction that popular democracy was a danger to capitalism.” 
(Polanyi: 226) And they were right: unlimited legislation poses dangers to the rules that
run the commercial society. Economic liberty is a necessary condition for the raising of 
the living standards of all. The silent erosion of the productive basis of society can be 
quite devastating. (See also: Locke, TTG: §48; Mises: 88; Hayek, CoL: 182) The 
Spencerian argument against unlimited democracy is still an important lesson.
Unfortunately, Spencer denied the possibility of (even a limited) welfare state. This is 
not a necessary consequence of the perfectly reasonable demand that welfare functions 
be limited in order to safeguard individual liberty. He went too far in his criticism. The 
libertarianism that developed from Spencer, while it correctly identified the danger in 
welfarism, unfortunately went too far in treating property rights as absolute.
In France, too, Bastiat argued, on explicitly Lockean grounds, in The Law15 (1850), that
any attempts to go beyond the very limited sphere of the minimal state are a "complete 
perversion of the law". The only function of the law is the protection of the absolute 
right to private property. This is Locke on steroids. Any redistributive measures are, in 
effect, theft. (Sounds like Nozick?)
14 Online edition without page numbers.
15 Online edition without page numbers.
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Bastiat's reading of the Lockean first two principles leads to a rights-fanaticism. I, on 
the other hand, wish to defend Lockean rights on consequentialist terms, modified by 
two Provisos and the law of Charity, and subject to limited democratic control. There is 
no intrinsic reason why private property owners should be entitled to the full ownership
of their labour, except if such ownership is beneficial to the development of the society. 
(Lucky for them that a strong regime of property rights is indeed beneficial!) 
Spencer  and  Bastiat  failed  to  understand  that  even  a  commercial  society,  with  a
flourishing free market, needs a safety net for people who fall through the cracks. The
process of “creative destruction”, whereby old means of production – firms, products
and ideas - are ruthlessly replaced by newer and more efficient ones, is “the essence of
capitalism.”  (Schumpeter:  104).  This  is  even  more  true  today.  Such  a  system
desperately needs a government to balance the destructive power of the market.
Spencer's and Bastiat's radicalised interpretations, although an improvement in rigour
and logical consistency, led to an obscene deification of the labour theory of value, and
the treatment of property rights as absolutes in a way that is not justified based on the
Lockean roots of classical liberalism. I propose a weaker version of the labour theory,
according to which property rights are not absolute, but susceptible to enough taxation
to fund a limited welfare system that implements a Basic Income Guarantee. (Cf. Ch.6)
But we do not have to linger with Spencer and Bastiat, because libertarianism is their
20th century heir. And the greatest thinker in that tradition is probably Robert Nozick.
4.2 Robert Nozick: The Doctrine of the Minimal State
Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) is libertarian masterpiece. It also 
shows how libertarianism is different from classical liberalism. To be more precise, 
libertarianism is one (welfare) principle short of classical liberalism. It focuses on 
property rights at the expense of the positive role that government can play even in the 
liberal framework. Consequently, libertarianism is liberalism without welfarism.
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Thomas Scanlon, in his essay on Nozick's theory, writes that “the conclusions of the 
book […] are liberal in the nineteenth-century sense of the term.” (Scanlon: 107) We 
have already seen that 19th century liberalism, in the form that Spencer and Bastiat 
developed it, was moving fast in the libertarian direction. Nozick is following on that 
path. The result is the exultation of the minimal state, which is limited to the protection 
of property and contracts. Thus Nozickeanism is a form of radicalised Lockeanism. It 
leads to a devastating denial of the limited welfare state. “Citizens may band together 
for whatever other purposes they may desire – to provide education, to aid the needy, to
organize social insurance schemes – but such schemes must be purely voluntary, and 
the state must enforce anyone's right not to be compelled to contribute to them.” 
(Scanlon: 107). The welfare state must be dismantled, destroyed, burned down.
Behind every society is the individual: “[T]he particular property rights protected by 
the minimal state are not licensed or created by it and consequently do not need to be 
defended as part of its justification. These rights are ones that individuals have quite 
independently of the social institutions in which they live.” (Scanlon: 123)
The property rights that emerge are not only thick (Tomasi: 91) and robust. They are 
absolute and unquestionable: “In enforcing these [absolute property and contract] rights
the minimal state is only doing for them what they were already entitled to do for 
themselves. Consequently it is not doing anything that could be held to infringe 
anyone's liberty.” (Scanlon: 123) The minimal state derives its justification from what 
Thomas Scanlon calls “the natural right of non-interference” (ibid.: 124). But Nozick is
right only if we accept that Lockean natural rights imply absolute property rights.
I want to argue that Nozickean libertarianism represents a reduced, simplified version 
of classical liberalism, that provides a systematically coherent and logically sound 
theory that has enormous appeal. But I also suggest that even Nozickean libertarianism,
as simplified liberalism, cannot provide a sufficient basis for a good society, since the 
rights-based reading of Lockean property rights is very much underdeveloped. Locke's 
own account, where rights-based and consequentialist arguments are combined, 
provides a better, if messier, justification of thick property rights (limited by Principle 
3). Nozick is continuing the classical liberal tradition, but he fails to do justice to the 
rich (rule-)consequentialist justifications for the Three Principles found in, say, Locke.
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Since libertarianism is simply a coherent development of the first two principles of 
liberalism, its teachings have lasting value for any decent liberal society. I argue that 
libertarianism is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a market liberal society. 
In other words, every great classical liberal utopia will need to have strong libertarian 
principles (of freedom from private and public coercion) embedded into its 
constitutional and welfare-providing structure. The important and necessary libertarian 
principles that any decent (classically) liberal society will have to respect lead to a 
strong commitment to the self-ownership of one's body and the inalienable right (for all
tax-payers) to “capitalist acts between consenting adults” (Nozick: 163). 
However, since libertarianism is not sufficient, these principles need to be 
supplemented by the third principle, which entails a limited welfare regime that 
protects the rights of the least well-off under the Lockean proviso. Libertarianism, in its
denial of the right to minimum income and public goods, denies the basis for a decent 
liberal society. But we can also look at Nozick's theory more sympathetically: since it 
contains 2 out of the 3 Principles of liberty, it remains mostly right. Unfortunately, the 
one principle that it did drop proves to be vital to the justification of the rest.
But before I get ahead of myself, let us first take a look at Nozick's theory. We need to 
see where libertarianism succeeds in order to be able to see where it fails. 
4.2.1 Nozick on Principle 1: Unlimited Private Property
Nozick immediately takes on the First Principle of Liberalism and embraces it fully. In 
order to develop it, Nozick takes the Kantian "side-constraints" approach to rights. This
means that rights are defined negatively, as the inviolability of certain borders and 
limits (including the border of the human body, one's property, land and possessions). 
People constrain each other by defining the borders between them as the limits of their 
person. People are not to impose themselves, to intrude, without being asked. Such acts 
are wrongs, since they violate people's rights. (28-32)
Calling these rights “Kantian” is a bit misleading, however, since they are shared by the
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other classical liberal thinkers, of whom Kant is one. Indeed, my argument is that 
Nozick is here simply reiterating the First Principle of Classical Liberalism, which he 
borrows from Locke and Kant, whom both formulated their own versions of it.16 Thus 
Nozick's “side-constraints”, the so-called Kantian rights that he takes for granted, could
equally be called Lockean, Smithean, or Hayekian, rights. They are simply the Three 
Principles – or, as libertarianism rejects welfare, the Two Principles – of liberalism.
Nozick, in accepting the first principle, accepts liberalism as an attempt to limit 
coercion, defined as aggression against one's person and property: "Political philosophy
is concerned only with certain ways that persons may not use others; primarily, 
physically aggressing against them." (32) The side constraints suppose the limits of 
private property; and the inviolability of one's own body as sovereign territory. The 
Lockean phrase “life, liberty and estates” encapsulates the entire domain of rights.
Nozick's libertarian creed is firmly individualistic: "There is no justified sacrifice of 
someone for others." (32) "There are only individual people, different individual 
people, with their own individual lives." (33) This leads to a conception of property as 
an extension of oneself. Any violation of my property is a violation of my person. We 
are all "distinct individuals who are not resources for others." (32) This leads to a firm 
denial of any redistribution as a form of aggression, rape or even enslavement.
His so-called “entitlement theory” (207-8) specifies a process for generating sets of 
holdings. He claims that if the initial appropriation is just – on simplified Lockean 
grounds – the property becomes the absolute dominion of its owner, who may do it 
what she wills. The only permissible way anybody can acquire property that belongs to 
someone else (who either acquired it by an initial appropriation or from someone else 
who acquired it by an initial appropriation) is by market exchange or as a gift. Property
that is acquired in any other manner is subject to the principle of rectification, which 
specifies that the unlawful owner of the property has to give it back to its lawful owner 
and/or compensate for damages. These principles are the totality of libertarian justice.
The Three Principles of justice (which he calls, in terms slightly different than mine, 
“acquisition”, “transfer” and “rectification”) “specify an ongoing process, without 
16 For Kant's classical liberalism, see Fernando R. Téson & Bas van der Vossen (2012).
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fixing how it is to turn out, without providing some external patterned criterion it must 
meet." (208) This theory is very elegant, since it cleans up the messier Lockean theory 
and sharpens the edges of the boundaries between people. As a theory of limits, it is 
absolutely brilliant. It leaves very little to ambiguity – except, of course, matters of 
criminal justice – and it thus satisfies Buchanan's criteria that the rights should be 
“well-defined and non-arbitrary” (1975: 18). If theories would be rated based on their 
elegance, Nozick's would rate very high. However, it has some serious flaws. Even 
though doctrines of limit need clear rules, they also need (especially in the absence of 
firm a priori justifications) consequentialist justifications – the sort that Nozick rejects. 
I will argue that Nozick's “entitlement theory” is a good summary of the first two 
principles of liberalism – the “libertarian core” of classical liberalism – and it thus is 
very valuable for our analysis. However, the best justification for those limits that the 
entitlement theory is supposed to protect – the libertarian property rights – is based on 
the socially beneficial nature of those rights (cf. Locke, TTG: §30, §43) This means 
that, if the entitlement theory ends up leaving some people worse off, its justification is 
in jeopardy. It seems unlikely that a purely entitlement-based society, with no Pareto-
optimizing redistribution, could be the best possible society for all people. (This, of 
course, is an empirical question. It all depends on the likely consequences. In some 
possible worlds Nozickean libertarianism produces the most wealth in the long-run. 
And, without trying, it is impossible to say whether we live in that world.)
I have no doubt that strong property rights – subject to something like Nozick's 
“entitlement theory” - are a very good mechanism for creating a dynamic society that 
benefits all people in the long run. But Nozick fails to give reasons (beyond the 
unsatisfying appeal to Kantian rights) why his system is immune from slight Pareto-
optimizing modifications, tweaks, of the sort that I will provide in Chapters 5-6, where 
I defend the “bleeding-heart libertarian” version of the classical liberal welfare state.
Nozick makes repeated allusions to Lockean principles and themes. "The constraints 
are set [...] by the Lockean rights people possess” (171) in the minimal state. Nozick is 
not blind to problems that the simplified Lockean account brings. He openly 
acknowledges problems with both the "mixing labour" theory (174) and the "added 
value from labour" theory (175) of Locke. These are deeply embedded in Locke's 
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conception of property, which Nozick incorporates into his own theory. But Nozick 
fails to justify them, and even pokes holes at them, thus digging his own grave. In 
taking Kantian rights as given, and the Lockean appropriation as given, his theory is 
very shaky indeed: it is a beautiful construction built on top of a house of cards.
Nonetheless, his book contains a wonderful account of the minimal state. The elegance 
of the entitlement theory is matched by the elegance of the minarchist state. Even 
though its justifications are lacking, it contains grounds for a utopia that I will try to 
incorporate, with modifications, into “bleeding-heart libertarianism”.
                    4.2.2 Nozick on Principle 2: The Minimal State 
Nozick takes on the task of limiting government power by showing that government, in
order to be good, must be limited by firm principles. First he needs to show that 
government is necessary, and can be just. 
He claims that the minimal state can be seen to arise naturally, without violating 
anyone's rights. He takes the state of nature to be a largely a heuristic device: "We learn
much by seeing how the state could have arisen, even if it didn't arise that way." (9)
People living in a state of nature, the classical starting position of Locke, are living in a 
state of freedom, which Nozick takes to be a state of free market anarchy. But, 
according to Nozick, no pure state of anarchy can last very long without ending being 
governed by a libertarian state: "Out of anarchy [...] there arises something very much 
resembling a minimal state or a group of geographically distinct minimal states." (16-
17) This makes sense, since, the first Two Principles of classical liberalism are 
interrelated. Out of Principle 1 – the birth of possessions - there logically and 
transitively rises Principle 2 – the birth of government. And although Nozick's account 
is pseudo-historical, the point is the same: private property cannot exist (for long) 
without a common judge. Locke suggested the same. And the lack of anarcho-capitalist 
nations in the world also suggests that it is very difficult to have property without law. 
Indeed, one does not really have property rights, unless and until they are enforced.
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The emerging minimal state needs powers of taxation. Indeed, at the first glance,"the 
night-watchman state [i.e. the minimal state] appears redistributive" (ibid: 27) because 
it extracts money from its citizens. And since Nozick is concerned with denying the 
validity of any redistribution, he has to somehow get around this inconvenient fact. His 
solution relies on the difference between compensatory and redistributive reasons: 
"Whether we say an institution that takes money from some and gives it to others is 
redistributive will depend upon why we think it does so. Returning stolen money or 
compensating for violations of rights are not redistributive reasons." (27) This 
constitutes Nozick's denunciation of all redistribution. If one is raped, one is entitled to 
compensations, but if one is poor, one is not entitled to redistributions. In the one case 
there is a crime, a victim, and a perpetrator; in the other case there is no crime, no 
victim (in the strictest sense of the term), and no perpetrator. This is a brilliant argument
against the welfare state. After all, how can we justify taking money from someone who
hasn't done anything wrong, and giving it to someone who has done nothing to deserve 
it? Surely there can be no justification for such transfers? But Nozick is here working 
with the assumption that the institution of private property is a process of encapsulating
absolute property rights, rather than a social institution for the creation of wealth. The 
virtue of his theory is that its parts are quite clear. The property rights are clear; the 
functions of the state are clear; and the mechanisms of exchange are clear. But in order 
to justify the absolute the justice of the holdings, one needs a better theory about the 
origin of property rights than Nozick has been able to give. In the absence of such a 
theory, one cannot rule out that, in fact, redistributions might be, after all, justified. 
We will discuss the limitations and weaknesses of Nozick's arguments more in the next 
section, so let us have a quick look at Nozick's utopianism. In the last part - “Utopia” - 
Nozick aims to show that “in addition to being uniquely right, the minimal state is not 
uninspiring." (53). He proposes “a framework for utopias, […] where people are at 
liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and attempt to realize their own vision of 
the good life in the ideal community but where no one can impose his own utopian 
vision upon others.” (312) This is a worthy goal, I think. It is also perfectly compatible 
with the sort of bleeding-heart libertarian framework that we are working towards.
Human ingenuity knows no limits, so utopias know no limits. The only limits all 
utopian societies should always respect, and treat as moral universals, are the liberal 
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limits of liberty against violence and coercion (the 1st principle). This is where the 
minimal state (the 2nd principle) steps in, to protect dreamers. No Principle 3 needed.
“We argued in Part I that the minimal state is morally legitimate; in Part II we 
argued that no more extensive state could be morally justified, that any more 
extensive state would (will) violate the rights of individuals. [Now we must 
conclude that the minimal state] is the one that best realises the utopian 
aspirations of untold dreamers and visionaries.” (333)
4.2.3 Nozick on Principle 3: The Denial of Redistribution
Concluding Part 1 (“Anarchy”), he writes that the minimal state is as far as we should 
go: "Having gotten from anarchy to the minimal state, our next major task is to 
establish that we should proceed no further" (146). And, again, opening Part II: "The 
minimal state is the most extensive state that can be justified. Any state more extensive 
violates people's rights" (149). The minimal state is a government big enough to be able
to enforce people's rights (the libertarian core); but not big enough to be able to violate 
them. It is limited government in the strictest sense of a minimal government.
My approach, as I have stated, attempts to justify a consequentialist reading of property
rights. To this approach, Nozick is antagonistic. Nozick argues that utilitarian17 
calculations of maximizing welfare or happiness cannot be enforced without violating 
people's individual rights, property, side-constraints. The end, however noble, does not 
justify the means. Utilitarianism is only fitting for the welfare of animals. This leads 
Nozick to the formulation: "utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people" (39).
Nozick's libertarianism thus leads to a denial of the importance of the 3rd principle.
Nonetheless, the situation is complicated by a) Nozick's respect for Locke's “Proviso” 
and B) the libertarian principle of rectification. Let us tackle the latter question first.
A) There is a Nozickean case for some (temporarily extensive) redistribution based on 
17 Of course utilitarianism, in the strict sense of maximizing happiness, is very different from the 
consequentialist arguments Locke has made in favour of property rights as tools for prosperity. 
Nonetheless, the same arguments that Nozick uses to attack Mill's utilitarianism apply to them. 
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his principle of rectification:
"Perhaps it is best to view some patterned principles of distributive justice as 
rough rules of thumb meant to approximate the general results of applying the 
principle of rectification of injustice. […] [A]n important question for each 
society will be the following: given its particular history, what operable rules of 
thumb best approximate the results of a detailed application in that society of 
the principle of rectification. In the absence of such a treatment applied to a 
particular society, one cannot use the analysis and theory presented here to 
condemn any particular scheme of transfer payments, unless it is clear that no 
considerations of rectification of injustice could apply to justify it.”
(230-231) 
Thus, in the short run, a more-than-minimal government might be justified even under 
the Nozickean paradigm: “Although to introduce socialism as the punishment for our 
sins would be to go too far, past injustices might be so great as to make necessary in the
short run a more extensive state in order to rectify them.” (ibid.) It all “depends upon 
how the distribution came about.” (232) Nozick's emphasis on historical justification 
can lead to very different-looking results based on the particular historical facts of the 
society in question. Some societies might end up quite heavily socialistic.
Nozick’s theory does not preclude a strong (if temporary) compensatory state if the 
origins of the property and wealth distribution can be shown to have unjustly arisen in 
violation of human rights. This faces huge empirical problems, of course. All attempts 
to justify state action (or inaction) based on history are subject to interpretation and 
fundamental epistemological problems. How does one know, or study, whether wealth 
distributions have arisen legitimately? Individuals, groups, ethnicities, religious groups,
minorities, etc., can make claims that they have been the victims of systematic 
oppression. The onus of proof is on them, of course. In some cases the verdict is clear. 
But even in a clear case, such as ethnic cleansing, the calculation of the precise sum of 
compensation becomes a nightmare. Who are to be its recipients? The living victims of 
past abuse? The families and descendants of the victims? Everybody who comes from 
the same ethnic group, whether or not they were actually personally persecuted?
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Pragmatically, it is perhaps best that we start from the present and not dwell on the past.
The real past, if you look hard enough, is “red in tooth and claw.” Only the present has 
the chance of turning things around. This is why I do not think that historical arguments
are the best place to start thinking about welfare questions. (But, of course, for Nozick's
historical entitlement theory, history is the only place where he can start.)
At any rate, Nozick would be the first to admit that his theory cannot be used to justify 
or condemn the present distribution of holdings in any given society. It can only justify 
the distribution of holdings in such an idealistic libertarian society where rights have 
never been violated without just punishment/rectification. For the same reason, it 
cannot be used to defend or condemn any particular welfare state action(s). 
B) In a chapter called "Locke's theory of acquisition,” Nozick explores the "enough 
and as good” - “Lockean” - Proviso (175-176). Nozick attempts to rebut the claim 
that because the proviso is violated, no natural right to private property can arise.
Ryan comments: “If we take [the proviso] to mean that individual appropriation [should
not be allowed to] diminish the freedom of others to use land and goods they now 
exploit in common, it is obvious that the proviso puts an effective throttle on almost 
any extensions of private acquisition”. (Ryan: 338) Nozick must reject this conclusion.
To his credit, Nozick discusses the proviso in detail, unlike many other libertarians. He 
accepts its logic, but wishes to limit the proviso only to the most extreme cases: e.g. 
that “a person may not appropriate the only water hole in the desert” (180). Nozick 
believes that the proviso, while important, is not sufficient grounds for fundamentally 
deviating from a free market approach to organizing society: “the proviso will not play 
a very important role in the activities of the protective agencies and will not provide a 
significant opportunity for future state action” (182). Indeed, “the free operation of the 
market system will not actually run afoul of the Lockean proviso”. (ibid.) 
Jan Narveson, another libertarian, claims, on the same logic, that the Lockean Proviso 
“does nothing to support the idea of an enforceable obligation to maintain a 'safety net' 
of involuntarily supported social services. […] the Lockean Proviso as Locke framed it 
is a mistake.” [I]n the only form in which it is sustainable […] it has no redistributive 
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implications, requiring only that people not acquire by force or fraud.” (127-128) 
Interestingly for my purposes, Nozick discusses the feasibility of the Basic Income 
Guarantee (which we shall explore at length in Chapter 6). He considers whether it 
might, indeed, be justified by the Lockean Proviso and his own Rectification Principle. 
But he thinks not: 'Fourier held that since the process of civilization had deprived 
members of society of certain liberties […] a socially guaranteed minimum provision 
for persons was justified as compensation for the loss […]. But this puts the point too 
strongly. This compensation would be due those persons, if any, for whom the process 
of civilization was net loss, for whom the benefits of civilization did not counterbalance
being deprived of these particular liberties.'”  (178, footnote) So compensation would 
be due to those persons who suffered from the institution of private property. Nozick 
thinks that private property benefits everybody - even those without property. And since
everybody is (assumed to be) better off as a result, there is no cause for compensation. 
However, hardly anybody – except hardcore libertarians – would claim that private 
property rights always benefit anybody who comes into contact with them. Most 
reasonable theories acknowledge that some people will always be worse off. From this 
conclusion, Nozick's conclusion might have to be reversed: If there are losers, they 
should be compensated. (And we shall suggest precisely such a scheme in Chapter 6.)
But I think that there is big a problem with the “everybody is now better off”-argument.
Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that everybody really is better off. 
Nonetheless, perhaps there exists another system, a better system, under which 
everybody would be even better off (or at least nobody would be worse off). Then the 
current system would be suboptimal. Surely we should be fighting to change the current
society towards that, at least if we can get there via a Pareto-improvement? 
After all, let us imagine a scenario: there are a hundred candy bars on the table. There 
are two people, A and B. A is faster and grabs 99 candy bars, leaving only 1 to B. And 
let us assume both parties acquiesce to the rules of the game. It is true that B is 
(slightly) better off than he would have been, had he not taken part in the game at all. 
(While A is exorbitantly better off.) But under a different set of rules for the game – say,
according to which any single person can only acquire up to ¾ of the total candy bars – 
B's expected outcomes would have been much better. Thus the rules of the game 
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seriously affected the outcome of his fortunes. Thus, from the fact that everybody is 
better off, we cannot draw the conclusion that rules shouldn't be tweaked even further.
Under certain reading, the Lockean proviso is sufficiently satisfied by the fact that poor 
people are better off under a system of private property and monetary exchange than in 
a system of common ownership of natural resources. No further redistribution would be
needed. And indeed, if the market process can handle the (re)distribution, there is no 
need to rely on the Leviathan to do it. While Locke never explicitly advocates for a 
redistributive programme, he leaves the republican commonwealth with the power to 
decide upon its regime of taxation and public spending, in the interest of the “common 
good”, quite freely. And his argument from Charity (TTG: 1, §42) is quite clear: each 
man has a right to basic subsistence – even at other people's, even Nozick's, expense. 
(And, on this logic, I will defend the Fourierian Basic Income Guarantee in Ch.6.)
Overall, in discussing “The Proviso” (178-182), Nozick engages in a honest discussion 
about the Lockean proviso and its political implications. And while he rejects its 
redistributive implications (under normal conditions), at least he acknowledges that it 
poses serious questions, to which he does not always have good answers.
O'Neill I think pretty conclusively shows that the Locke-Nozick entitlement theory 
does not grant unlimited private property rights, since the original acquisition is 
theoretically suspect (O'Neill: 305-322). Thus: “Even if we share with Locke and 
Nozick the view that individuals have rights not be harmed in life, health, or liberty, we
have so far no reason to accept entitlement theory” (O'Neill: 321) - at least as far as its 
justifying total laissez-faire capitalism. Recognizing weaknesses in Nozick's theory 
recommends “a retreat from Nozick's streamlined Locke” (ibid: 316). We may, 
however, accept a softened version of the theory, according to which property rights 
may be curtailed only so far as the equal freedom and opportunity of others is ensured 
by the limited range of permissible actions of the limited welfare state. 
We don't need to go as far to completely reject Nozick's theory: we only need to draw 
certain boundary conditions around it (e.g. Locke's “Charity”: TTG, 1, §42.). Within 
those boundary conditions the entitlement theory rules: free market exchange, and 
voluntary interaction, determine all permissible moves and outcomes. Thus we can call 
47
the resulting society substantially libertarian, but not hardcore libertarian, because it 
takes seriously the (however limited) public responsibilities of the government.
Nozick can guide us half-way. We need to re-imagine classical liberalism as bleeding-
heart libertarianism. According to this view, a limited government and the free market 
can coexist: the first two principles of liberalism can coexist with the third principle.
Freedom does not mean freedom from taxation. The government is limited but not 
minimal. But outside of the rule of law, all private action, no matter how morally 
questionable, and no matter how inequality-producing, are permitted, within the bounds
of the Three Principles. The limited government enacts abstract and general rules, 
maintains a basic framework of security (including social security), and provides 
certain services and public goods for its citizens. But it does no more than this. 
Libertarianism fails to prove that we should stop at the minimal state. Even Nozick's 
theory cannot do it. However, its elegance as an overall theory can give birth to a new 
respect for the “libertarian core” of classical liberalism. This only requires that absolute
property rights are turned into non-absolute-but-thick property rights. The classical 
liberal approach shares with Nozick the idea that property rights and limits on state 
coercion are fundamental to any liberal utopia. But there is no reason why thick 
property rights shouldn't be compatible with the limited provision of public goods. 
(And indeed, in Chapter 5 we shall see how Tomasi, Smith and Hayek combine them.)
Is Thomas Scanlon right in claiming that in recent “contemporary moral and political 
philosophy, […] economic rights and liberties have generally been neglected in favor of
political and civil liberties” (Scanlon: 127)? It certainly seems that way: ”Freedom of 
economic contract, a key feature of the free markets championed by classical liberals, is
not recognized [...] as a basic right.” (Tomasi: 43) I must agree with Tomasi that the 
“[welfare] liberal neglect of [economic] liberty [i]s a significant moral defect.” 
(Tomasi: 3) The incredible wealth-creating power of the classical liberal doctrine of the 
Three Principles should be harnessed by people who want to help people. Economic 
liberty needs to make a comeback as a fundamental right18 of all poor people.
18 By “right”, I mean, as always, a system of rules that must be respected, and institutionalized, over 
long periods of time, in order for its good effects, and social benefits – what Hume called “public 
utility” - to show themselves. I do not mean an eternal principle that God and Reason can give.
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Even Peter Singer, although very critical of Nozick, concedes that government-
involving egalitarianism has become a dogma in political philosophy: “Political 
philosophers have tended to assume without argument that justice demands an 
extensive redistribution of wealth in the direction of equality; and that it is a legitimate 
function of the state to bring about this redistribution by coercive means like 
progressive taxation.” (Singer: 37) For such aims, notions like “private property” and 
“limited government” might seem outdated or even oppressive. 
But they are actually beneficial. This is why limited “social justice” needs to limit the 
government. We should cherish and respect the libertarian core of liberalism made 
clearer by Nozick's theory - without accepting Nozick's definition of the minimal state. 
I will argue for a limited welfare state with strong libertarian principles. This is not a 
very radical departure from the classical liberal tradition; it is only its rediscovery. 
But let me first recapitulate the differences between Locke and the libertarians.
4.3 John Locke vs. Murray Rothbard: Why Liberty is not Enough
We have seen that classical liberalism is a doctrine of limits, where limits are set to 
(coercive) private action and government action. (Principles 1 and 2 respectively)
The dilemma posed is essentially one of finding the balance between anarchy and 
collective coercion: “If […] the collectivity is empowered to enforce individual rights, 
how is it to be preserved from going beyond these limits?” (Buchanan 1975: 13).
I wish to claim that libertarianism – as represented by Nozick and Rothbard – provides 
one perfectly logical development and radicalization of the Lockean-Smithean 
paradigm of limited government, but not the only possible such development.
Locke is often seen (by libertarians themselves) as one of the first to provide a 
justification, however fuzzy, of libertarian doctrine. This is true. He advocated the 
Three Principles - the first two of which (1 and 2) are very much libertarian. But Locke 
was not a hardcore libertarian. His libertarianism was softened by certain boundary 
conditions. Rather, we should rather say that libertarianism is a “stripped-down” 
Lockeanism: the Three Principles of Classical Liberalism... minus one principle.
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Hardcore libertarianism can be summarized as the doctrine that…
… every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right
to but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may 
say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that 
nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and 
joined it to something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It
being by him removed from the common state nature placed it in, it hath 
by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of 
other men. For this labour being the unquestionable property of the 
labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to. 
(Rothbard: 38)
This, of course, is actually a quotation from Locke’s TTG (§27). What is more 
interesting is what Rothbard leaves out.19 Cf. the entire paragraph in the original text:
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet 
every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to
but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may 
say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that 
nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and 
joined it to something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It
being by him removed from the common state nature placed it in, it hath 
by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of 
other men. For this labour being the unquestionable property of the 
labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at 
least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others. 
(emphasis added!) (TTG: §27)
It is obvious what the differences are. What is fascinating is that Rothbard has simply 
left out the non-libertarian elements in John Locke’s philosophy. Thus, libertarianism is
classical liberalism without welfare side-clauses. Robert Nozick repeats the same 
19 I am indebted to Goodreads.com-user named “0spinboson” for pointing this out to me.
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pattern: his “historical entitlement”-theory (Nozick: 207-208) derives from the very 
same Lockean paragraph quoted by Rothbard, with most of the “non-libertarian” bits 
dropped out. (Although at least Nozick takes the Proviso quite seriously.)
So, what are these non-libertarian bits that libertarians like to omit? They are, e.g., a) 
Locke's two Provisos; b) his argument from Charity20; and b) his argument from 
Democracy. Thus, the Lockean theory provides additional limits to the libertarian 
property rights not provided by Nozick's or Rothbard's readings of Locke. They also 
complicate the story, making it fuzzier, less clear – perhaps less elegant, too. But they 
enable a comprehensive consequentialist understanding of the aims of social 
institutions, in which private property is just one socially beneficial institution, whose 
justification cannot extend beyond the overall good fortune it may bring to society. 
Libertarians should try to reach back to these consequentialist “deep roots”, in order to 
maybe get a better sense of the role that institutional, legal and rule-justifications have 
in the arguments that people like Locke, Smith, Hume and Hayek make for liberty. 
We can say that libertarianism is a radicalization of the classical liberal program: Locke
without Provisos, Charity or Whig politics. The libertarians' property rights are more 
absolute than the regulated-but-thick property rights of classical liberalism.
Of course, such a radicalization of the liberal doctrine did not emerge out of nowhere. It
was preceded by a few centuries of classical liberal talk about property rights and 
economic freedom. Libertarianism, for sure, is a logical development the 19th Century 
classical liberal tradition. It is possible to argue from Lockean premises, as Nozick 
does, that “the minimal state is the most extensive state that can be justified. Any state 
more extensive violates people's rights" (Nozick: 149). But the minimal state is only 
one possible interpretation of the limited state - and not the best one, either. 
The minimal state is governed by the Two Libertarian Principles. It is not enough. 
The limited state is governed by the Three Liberal Principles. It is enough.
20 For a summary view, see TTG, First Treatise, §42: “As Justice gives ever Man a Title to the product 
of his honest Industry, and the fair Acquisitions of his Ancestors descended to him; so Charity gives 
every Man a Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will keep him from extream want, where he has 
no means to subsist otherwise.” (TTG: I, §42); and for Nozick vs. Locke, see: Lloyd Thomas: 63-69.
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The classical liberal interpretation is superior because it provides a limited number of 
public functions as a boundary condition to the libertarian society. Such a society, 
because it maximizes liberty without sacrificing the basic livelihood of anyone, “is 
morally legitimate [… and] the one that best realises the utopian aspirations of untold 
dreamers and visionaries.” (Nozick: 333) The same, unfortunately, cannot be said for 
the antiwelfarist libertarian society for which these words were originally aimed at.
While I have criticized Nozick's theory of property rights as exemplifying a version of 
absolute property rights that is incomplete, we must also acknowledge that the 
libertarian challenge forces liberalism to hold onto the importance of property rights for
any satisfying conception of justice. “It is the virtue of the book [Anarchy, State and 
Utopia] that it forces us to consider economic institutions not merely as mechanisms for
the distribution of goods but also, like political institutions, as placing restrictions and 
demands on us which raise questions of obligation.” (Scanlon: 127)
If we take the libertarian challenge seriously, “it becomes apparent that questions of 
economic liberty must be considered, along with political and civil liberty and fair 
distribution, as conditions for the legitimacy of social institutions.” (Scanlon: 127) No 
liberal theory of justice, and no welfare principle, is complete or even justifiable 
without a thick conception of property rights (Tomasi: 91). The welfare principle of 
liberalism should be implemented on top of libertarianism, rather than instead of it. This
project differs from many current welfare liberal programs. Such a project might be 
unpopular today, but, like Scanlon, “I hope this will have an impact on contemporary 
moral and political philosophy, where economic rights and liberties have generally been
neglected in favor of political and civil liberties and rights of other sorts”. (ibid. 127) 
I  believe,  with  E.F.  Paul,  that  the  rediscovery  of  the  limited  government  as  a
methodological,  philosophical  and  political  programme  “provides  a  much  needed
antidote to the twentieth century fascination with the all encompassing, over-weaning,
rights-violating,  bureaucratic  state.”  (Paul:  276)  The  end  result  will  be  the  limited
welfare state, which, as I will now try to show, can provide a credible alternative to the
tyrannical and unlimited welfare states that have risen up in recent centuries.
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5  . The Classical Liberal Welfare State
”The ultimate  ideal  envisioned by liberalism is  the  perfect  coordination  of all  
mankind, taking place peacefully and without friction.” (Mises: 105)
I have defended the principles of classical liberalism on consequentialist grounds. A
reading of Locke has suggested that classical liberalism needs to be justified on the
basis  of  its  social  consequences,  and  that  these  consequences  must  also  include
considerations  of  public  institutions  and  non-libertarian  methods.  I  have  rejected
hardcore libertarianism and its denial of the welfare state. However, since I want to
hold on to the “libertarian core” of classical liberalism, I must now explain how one can
justify any version of the welfare state - without destroying liberty in the process.
So what is the proposed utopia? I take these two hypotheses to be simultaneously true: 
A) It is immoral to “forbid capitalist acts between consenting adults" (Nozick: 163).
B) It is immoral to leave people without a guarantee of basic subsistence. (TTG: 1, §42)
The classical liberal welfare state should respect  both freedom and welfare. The only
way to fulfil condition (A) is to defend non-hardcore libertarianism. The only way to
fulfil condition (B) is to defend some notion of more-than-minimal redistribution. Such
a combined strategy can be defended on consequentialist grounds as Pareto-optimizing.
Many libertarians (and others) are afraid of the consequentialist logic. And they should
be: it leaves all basic principles open to attack. Private property rights and the limited
government,  if understood  as  absolute libertarian  first  principles,  cannot survive  a
consequentialist critique. Rights can only be justified for the consequences they have,
and  property  rights  also  have  negative  consequences  that  must  be  systematically
corrected for. And so we need a Pareto-optimizing (but limited) government. But at the
same time,  as Locke has already shown,  and as  Smith and Hayek will  soon show,
consequentialist  logic  also  yields  strong support  for  a  comprehensive  system  of
economic liberty, property rights, and limited government – much stronger support than
most welfare liberals, let alone social democrats, are quite willing to accept. 
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Lockean  property  rights  and  non-hardcore  libertarian  freedoms,  under  limited
government  power,  can  be  defended  -  and  almost  as  strongly as  under  the  rights-
approach of Nozick or Rothbard - as undoubtedly the most efficient available means to
raise the standards of living of the majority of the population.  Thus, if we are truly
concerned about  helping  the  poor,  and maximizing welfare,  we desperately need a
system  of  governance  based  on  bleeding-heart  libertarian,  or  classical  liberal,
principles. And it is my duty, in this chapter, to provide the blueprint of such a state,
with a little bit of help from John Tomasi, Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek.
                5.1 John Tomasi: Bleeding-Heart Libertarianism
“Strict  libertarianism  [what  I  call  'hardcore  libertarianism']  is
biologically  averse  to  such  ideals  [of  social  justice].  But  classical
liberalism, with its longer and more explicit history of concern for the
working  poor,  is  congenitally  open-minded  about  distributive
questions.” (Tomasi: 167)
John Tomasi's Free Market Fairness (2012) is probably the first book-length exposition
of the “bleeding-heart libertarian” position. It argues that the classical liberal argument
is  basically  right.  It  argues  that  we  should  choose  neither (Nozickean)  hardcore
libertarianism nor accept a version of soft socialism as the only “just” society.
Tomasi defines the classical liberal position in terms that are, by now, familiar. The
classical liberal utopia consists of “the system of thick economic liberty and limited
government” (Principles 1 and 2) where the government also provides a limited range
of public goods (Principle 3). (141)
It wishes to deny the argument that ”[p]roperty is the enemy of social justice.” (Tomasi:
46) On the contrary: it is its natural companion. On consequentialist grounds, Tomasi
argues that strong Lockean property rights and liberties are a fundamental part of any
regime of social justice.
In the chapter ”Property and the Poor” (pp. 127-142), Tomasi points out that a wide
selection of classical liberals and libertarians, including Locke, Mandeville, Madison,
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Spencer, Mises, Rand, Hayek, Friedman, Rothbard, Nozick, Mack and Epstein have
argued, basically on utilitarian or consequentialist grounds, that (among other things)
free market principles benefit the least well-off.21
1) Bleeding-Heart Libertarian Argument 1: Private property rights and limited
government are the best means that poor people have for getting rich. It emphasizes the
(direct and indirect)  positive benefits – positive externalities and possibilities – that
such a system provides for everybody. Such potential benefits of the free market include
(for the sake of the argument), e.g. economic growth, rising living standards, cheaper
consumer  products,  higher  wages,  developing  technologies,  better  and  safer  jobs,
possibilities of getting rich, choosing one's own occupation, pursuit of happiness, etc.
These results are often ignored in welfare liberal calculations, or outright dismissed,
because they are not the visible results of any government action. However, on purely
consequential  grounds,  they are  just  as  important,  or  even  more important,  for  the
improvement of the poor, than any government action. The huge gains in social utility
caused by the reduction in overall coercion that a regime of strong private property
rights brings about are a perfect example of how social benefits often include invisible,
distant and hard-to-measure effects  for the  whole society.  Thick economic freedom,
under a limited government, is an excellent way of building up chains of long-term
benefits. Thus the limited welfare state needs its libertarian core – principles 1 and 2 -
in order to maximize welfare for everybody, in an efficient way, in the long run.
2 ) Bleeding-Heart Libertarian Argument 2: The markets alone, while efficient and
beneficial,  are not  enough. The libertarian core needs to be supplemented by public
welfare  measures.  This  justifies  a  limited  range  of  public  actions  under  the  third
principle, since “the public provision of a social minimum is needed to guarantee the
effective exercise of citizen's basic liberties.” (Tomasi: 49)
Here Tomasi agrees that social liberal terminology – most notably, ideas of 'fairness'
and 'social justice' - are roughly appropriate in determining the aims of institutional
policy: ”Classical liberals should be concerned about how the system of thick economic
liberty  and  limited  government  affects  disadvantaged  citizens  because  they  should
insist  that the distribution of goods and opportunities be fair.”  (Tomasi:  141) Thus,
21 Although at least Rand, in that list – and perhaps Spencer, too – were actually very cold-hearted.
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contrary to hardcore libertarianism, bleeding-heart libertarians argue that there should
be “a tax-funded safety net even for the destitute.” (Tomasi: 49) The resulting limited
welfare state aims to ”set principled limits on the redistributory ambitions of the state,
while defining a threshold below which no class of citizens should fall.” (Tomasi: 94)
The end result is not a bureaucratic welfare state. Redistribution operates largely under
the rubric of a simple and general system. And it does not aim to subvert the market, or
control its direction.
”Within market democratic regimes, the distributional requirements of justice are to be
pursued mainly through the forces of spontaneous order.” (Tomasi: 87) 
The end result  is  a society that  is  still  fundamentally libertarian,  but  a  society that
incorporates the third principle of liberalism. It is, in other words, a liberal democracy
where  welfare  is  provided  under  a  “system of  thick  economic  liberty  and  limited
government” (141). 
Let us now turn to Adam Smith, who was perhaps the first to provide the outlines of a
free market society with a significant role for state institutions. I claim that Adam Smith
can be read to provide the outlines of a classical liberal limited welfare state, where all
the Three Principles of justice are respected. It is even possible to consider his solution
the first bleeding-heart libertarian utopia.
5.2 Adam Smith: The Roots of the Limited Welfare State
Here, I will try to show that Adam Smith's proposals for society and government are a 
decent blueprint for a liberal welfare state. I will focus on the Wealth of Nations (1776; 
hereafter WoN), although of course Smith's thinking extends beyond this seminal work.
As soon as we look at WoN, we see that Smith was a firm believer in the Three 
Principles of liberalism. He is also one of the strongest consequentialist-utilitarian 
defenders of the free market under a limited (welfare) state, so his work helps us 
formulate even more clearly why welfare (or social utility) should be seen primarily not
in terms of a static distribution of assets in the society (dividing the pie), but in terms of
fostering the dynamic development of the productive assets of the society (increasing 
the pie). Thinking simply in terms of existing assets will cause great harm to society. 
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The importance of economic freedom arises from such consequentialist reasoning. The 
best way to make people better off is to follow the classical liberal doctrine, which, in 
its simplest form, can be summarized as: 1) the defence of a government limited in its 
functions to the provision of what is needed for the protection of 2) individual rights; 
supplemented by the production of a 3) limited range of public goods.
Letwin summarizes: “the proper functions of the government, according to Smith, are 
to provide national defence, administer justice, maintain certain public works, ensure 
education of the young, and perhaps subsidize religious instruction.” (Letwin: 68)
Smith defends this vision on utilitarian grounds as the best way to advance the common
good. Or, to quote Smith himself, in a commercial society, “[e]very individual is 
continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for 
whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the 
society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather 
necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the 
society.” (WoN: 348) Evensky adds the important caveat: ”Or at least so it would be 
where there is 'perfect liberty” (Evensky: 192), which can never truly be.
One of the great insights of Smithean liberalism is that the pursuit of self-interest may 
further social goals. This is a strong utilitarian defence of the first two principles of 
liberalism. Setting limits on private and public coercion benefits everybody in the long 
run. This notion, of course, relates to the famous “invisible hand” -argument: 
”By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends 
only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its 
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in 
this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which 
was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was
not part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the 
society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.”  
(WoN: 349-350, my emphasis) 
The society gains massive, often hidden and unknowable, benefits from leaving people 
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largely alone to pursue their self-interest. The crucial point is that if we wish to promote
socially advantageous ends (from peace to prosperity), one of the most advantageous 
means to this end is not interfering with other people's business. Promoting good ends, 
via government and other designed institutions, often backfires. In fact, trying to do 
good is often one of most effective ways of doing harm. (See also Friedman: 27-36).
The capitalist profit motive, which is only possible where private property is firmly 
established (under Principle 1), advances the common good of the society. The full title 
of the book is An Inquiry into the Causes and Nature of the Wealth of Nations. The 
socially beneficial result is “Wealth” - which means the GDP but also more than that – 
and the “Causes” are good government policies, free trade and capitalist production. 
The radical lesson of the book is that removing government restrictions and regulations 
can be one of the main causes of the creation of wealth. The Smithean paradox is that 
the most efficient policies can sometimes be the most passive. 
Economic  freedom needs  a  framework  of  laws  that  fosters  peaceful  and voluntary
exchanges. As Buchanan writes, under conditions where ”rights are known to be well-
defined  and  non-arbitrary”  and  where  knowledge  about  them  is  widely  shared,
”economic interchange becomes almost the archetype of ordered anarchy.” (Buchanan
1975: 18) Because, “[h]aving defined and accepted a structure of rights, individuals can
reduce their own investment in defence and predation and go about their business of
increasing utility levels through freely negotiated dealings with each other.” (ibid.: 50)
The overall result is highly beneficial to society, but also chaotic, and hard to measure.
The “utility levels” are subjective, but the sum total of the interactions of the people
causes objectively measurable benefits, such as the growth of cities and new industries. 
The lack of patterned outcomes, and predictable results, makes it hard to justify (how
can you justify something that is invisible and unknowable?) - and harder to talk about.
And yet it is precisely this non-patterned, unpredictable nature of the system that makes
it so productive, beneficial and indispensable for an advancing commercial society.
Smith warns against excessive government power: “[T]he profusion of government 
must, undoubtedly, have retarded the natural progress of England towards wealth and 
improvement” (WoN: 270). The main source of wealth is not government policy, but 
the private action of free individuals: “In the midst of all the exactions of government, 
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this capital has been silently and gradually accumulated by the private frugality and 
good conduct of individuals, by their universal, continual, and uninterrupted effort to 
better their own condition. It is this effort, protected by law and allowed by liberty to 
exert itself in the manner that is most advantageous [to society].” (ibid., my emphasis)
He continues: “It is the highest impertinence and presumption, therefore, in kings and 
ministers, to pretend to watch over the economy of private people” (ibid.). The private 
sphere must be protected from counterproductive interferences. He laments that 
“England […] has never been blessed with a very parsimonious government.” (ibid.)
The phrase “parsimonious government” means limited government. (Principle 2) 
It is a “blessing” to limit the ability of governments to pester and control “the economy 
of private people”. The commercial society must incorporate a classical liberal 
“doctrine of the limits” in order to maximize its capacity for wealth-creation. People 
must learn to respect each other's private spheres, and to keep legislation modest.
Government should concentrate on producing public goods and leave the people, in 
their private business, alone. Such a course will benefit everybody in the long run:
“The security which the laws of Great Britain give to every man that he 
shall enjoy the fruits of his own labour, is alone sufficient to make any 
country flourish, notwithstanding [mercantile impediments] and twenty 
other absurd regulations of commerce. […] The natural effort of every 
individual to better his own condition, when suffered to exert itself with 
freedom and security, is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, and 
without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to 
wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred impertinent 
obstructions with which the folly of human laws too often encumbers its 
operations.” (WoN: 417-8)
Thus the utilitarian-consequentialist argument justifies a strong private sphere. But he 
also sees a role for public institutions in furthering the commercial society: “Thanks to 
[the country's] laws and institution, 'the yeomanry of England are rendered as secure, as
independent, and as respectable as law can make them' (WoN: 325), and ´'[t]hose laws 
and customs so favourable to the yeomanry, have perhaps contributed more to the 
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present grandeur of England than all their boasted regulations of commerce taken 
together.' (WoN: 305).” (quoted by Evensky: 180) These passages suggest that laws can
do a lot of harm or a lot of good, depending on their form and character.
Tomasi writes: ”Smith was convinced that the surest way to improve the condition of 
the poor over time was by creating the conditions of a flourishing free market. […] It 
was this idea that led Smith to advocate the carefully bounded social welfare programs 
that have so long been part of the classical liberal tradition.”  (Tomasi: 9, my 
emphasis) He wanted the market society to be supplemented by a limited range of 
public works, industry-encouraging legislation and welfare programs
Underlying Smith's faith in the market system was the belief that what is productive of 
the growth of opulence is “[o]rder and good government, and along with them the 
liberty and security of individuals. […] When [people] are secure of enjoying the fruits 
of their industry, they naturally exert it to better their condition.” (Evensky: 18) 
The economic utopia that Smith argued for was one of a mostly free market under a 
limited government: a “society where things were left to follow their natural course, 
where there was perfect liberty, and where every man was perfectly free both to choose 
what occupation he thought proper, and to change it as often as he thought proper. 
Every man's interest would prompt him to seek the advantageous, and to shun the 
disadvantageous employment.” (WoN: 82, my emphasis) The main instrument of 
prosperity, which benefits the whole society, including the poor, is economic freedom. 
A limited welfare state is permissible, but it is not the main engine of welfare. One 
cannot maximize social utility, or anything of the sort, by government alone. One needs
long-term rules of justice, including thick property rights, and the voluntary efforts of 
private individuals, to create suitable conditions that can allow the society to thrive.
Smith saw history as a progressive development of humankind from one stage of 
civilization to another. He believed that the commercial society was the most 
productive civilization thus far, and that it could be even more productive, if it allowed 
the private efforts of individuals to improve their own condition. Evensky explains, 
“the liberal plan is the best constitution for the working class because it produces the 
greatest wealth for the nation and distributes that wealth most justly [… while] the 
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freedom and security it affords each individual encourages the most productive use of 
resources.” (Evensky: 13)
Smith' limited government is quite far removed from the libertarian night-watchman 
state. Some (Saastamoinen, 1998) have wanted to see him as a social democrat. Winch 
might even be right in that “for Smith, the government in civilized communities had to 
be strong, adaptable, and probably expanding, even if he hoped its operations would not
be extensive and detailed in the economic field.” (Winch: 97) After all, a limited 
government can, and probably should, be strong and adaptable. Too little government 
causes social harm much in the same way that too much government does. The liberal 
doctrine does not forbid public interventions – it only circumscribes their boundaries. 
Within these limits, the government has the power to render services.
The state should, for example, subsidize the production of public works and the 
education of children. With regards to public works, “these should be paid for by their 
immediate users […]. Here again [Smith] applies the free-market principle that every 
person should bear the full cost, no less and no more, of consuming what he chooses. In
its broader political implication, this corresponds to the liberal intention to arrange 
matters, as far as possible, so that each individual bears the consequences of his own 
action”. (Letwin: 73) Wherever possible, one should favour a market-based or a 
market-friendly solution. This places necessary limits on government power and size. 
(This is no dogmatic argument, but rather a utilitarian calculation about which method 
of action is likely to cause more harm than good.)
In addition to general public works, ”it is essential, for both the private and public 
good, that government provide education to those perversely affected by” the division 
of labour in a commercial society.  (Evensky: 226) ”The man whose whole life is spent 
in performing a few simple operations […] generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as
it is possible for a human creature to become.[... And] in every improved and civilized 
society this is the state into which the labouring poor, that is, the greatest body of the 
people, must necessarily fall, unless government takes some pains to prevent it.” (WoN:
603) Thus the government should take pains to prevent this calamity. More specifically,
it should subsidize the education of the labouring poor, ”that is, the greatest body of the
people” (602). There is, however, no need for the government to provide for those who 
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can afford to educate their own families. Thus, although Smith was in favour of 
publicly funded education, there are limits to how far public monopolization should be 
taken. The erosion of market forces, implied by the involvement of the government in 
these fields, carries considerable risks to public and private welfare. 
A commercial society requires a framework of institutions, laws and regulations to 
produce the most opulence; but these government provisions, in turn, must be sensitive 
to the needs of the commercial society – mainly to let the principles of free trade and 
commerce spread wealth. The whole Smithean enterprise hinges on the beneficial 
effects of the liberal policies. Smith saw that “a key reason for England's commercial 
progress beyond the rest of Europe was its escape from many of the illiberal positive 
laws that constrained those other nations” (Evensky: 66). 
If we study the Smithean program of a limited government, we can, perhaps, find a way
for the state to provide for the basic welfare needs of its citizens, without succumbing 
to the temptations of the bureaucratic, tyrannical and over-expansive – not to mention 
over-expensive – dangers inherent in the Leviathan. The goal ought to be a liberal 
utopia where, as Smith put it,  “[e]very man, as long as he does not violate the laws of 
justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way [… and where] 
[t]he sovereign is completely discharged from […] the duty of superintending the 
industry of private people[.]” (WoN: 533) Such a utopia, with its unique appeal, is 
worth recapturing from the ultra-libertarians and the anti-liberal welfare statists alike. 
The only way that people can be “left perfectly free” is if the private sphere is delimited
by strong property rights, and if the rest of the law-regime is firmly in place. The 
Lockean-Nozickean “side-constraints” are the means to achieve a progressive society. 
The protection of the private sphere, and the nurturing of its productive capacities, is an
essential part of the institutional methods of any welfare state worthy of the name.
Of course, as Kari Saastamoinen (1998) notes, “[t]he state had also the role to provide 
such services whose supply was necessary for the sake of the public good, but which 
individual citizens were not economically incentivized to provide. This range of 
activities, for Smith, was by no means insignificant.” (52, emphasis added) 
But before we conclude that Smith was an unlimited social democrat we should 
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remember that these interventions were limited by certain principles of good 
governance and market-friendliness. The social welfare measures should support, rather
than hinder, the progress of the nation of free people. He calls his system the “system of
natural liberty”, which is a blueprint of the Three Principles of liberalism:
“According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties 
to attend to; three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to
common understandings: (1) the duty of protecting the society from violence 
and invasion of other independent societies; (2) the duty of protecting, as far as 
possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every 
other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice;
and (3) the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain 
public institutions which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or 
small number of individuals, to erect and maintain”. (WoN: 533-534)
The first two duties – simply, army and police – fall under the “nightwatchmanstate” 
(Principles 1 and 2), while the third duty – public works and institutions – is the welfare
state. (Principle 3) This is a perfect statement of the Three Principles of Liberalism.
We can now say that Smith was, indeed, a classical liberal. He not only laid the 
economic foundations of a prosperous commercial society, but also outlined the liberal 
framework suitable for it: “All systems, either of preference or of restraint, therefore, 
being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty 
establishes itself of its own accord." (WoN: 560) Adam Smith's Britain was quite 
different from today, which has led many people to consider WoN outdated. But while 
some of the particular problems in the book may have lost their relevance, the main 
insights about the commercial society, and the dangers to individual liberty, have not. 
The consequentialist arguments for free trade and private property are strong. Freedom,
while it initially gives to some more than others, also benefits the whole society.
It remains an important task to rescue the legacy of Smith from the claws of the 
hardcore libertarians, who conflate their own positions with those of Smith, and from 
the the social democrats, who do the same. Unlike the libertarians, Smith believed in 
the 3rd Principle. And unlike the social democrats, he believed in free markets. The 
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Smithean limited welfare state uses market means to achieve social benefits. 
Smith's justifications for public education and the provision of public works are typical 
examples of the limited welfare state that respects the Three Principles of Liberalism.
Smith's arguments about the wealth-creating power of economic freedom add support 
to the consequentialist arguments of Locke and Hume. Another person who continues 
in that same tradition is Friedrich von Hayek, to whom I shall turn next. He enables us 
to take the Smithean, Lockean and Humean arguments into the context of the 
contemporary welfare state debate, which we have been itching to get to.
5.3 Friedrich Hayek: The “Neoliberal” Welfare State
Friedrich Hayek is one of the most hardcore defenders of economic liberty. He has a
reputation of being the great antagonist of the welfare state. In the  Road to Serfdom
(1944), he argued that the trend of increasing government powers, for the sake of doing
good, is a slippery slope to the erosion of human liberties. So we should expect him to
be definitely against any notion of the welfare state. Right? But what if it turns out that
Hayek, contrary to his reputation, is actually in favour of a large number of government
programs?  Of  course  it  shouldn't  surprise  us.  We  have  already  seen  that  classical
liberalism,  except  for  its  hardcore  libertarian  wing,  does  not advocate  limiting
government down all the way to the minimal sate. To be sure, Hayek wanted to set
down some very strict rules against the expansion of the welfare state. It is also true
that he went quite far in opposing the very notion of “social justice.” (See below.) But
he also allowed for enough government activity, on consequentialist grounds, to count
as a bleeding-heart libertarian. We shall see that a Hayekian limited welfare state is not
only a possible outcome, but a necessary part, of his philosophical system.
But let us first look at Hayek's defence of economic liberty and the spontaneous order.
We have seen that Adam Smith, following the Mandevillean logic, famously argued
that  the  private  actions  of  individuals,  uncoordinated  by  common  aims,  lead  to
unintended public benefits. Thus a good society should leave as much as possible of the
decision-making  of  economic  life  in  the  hands  of  its  private  citizens.  A similar
consequentialist-utilitarian argument is made, a fortiori, by Hayek:
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”The possibility of men living together in peace and to their  mutual  
advantage  without  having  to  agree  on  common  concrete  aims,  and  
bound only by abstract rules of conduct, was perhaps the greatest 
discovery mankind ever made.” (LLL: 294)
Hayek saw himself  as a follower of Locke,  Smith,  Burke and the other Whigs.  He
consciously attempted to follow that tradition in his CoL (1960); and develop it further
in LLL (1982). His argument is quite thoroughly consequentialist or rule-utilitarian.
Property  rights  are  the  best  means  to  economize  scarce  resources:  “The  rules  of
property and contract are required to delimit the individual's private sphere wherever
the resources or services needed for the pursuit of his aims are scarce.” Consequently,
people must submit themselves to ”abstract and general rules that have been evolved to
limit coercion both by other individuals and by the state” (CoL: 209)
He argues that  the evolution of  liberal  laws culminates  in ”the essentially negative
confinement to a range of actions that will not interfere with the similarly recognized
spheres of others.” (Principle 1) The limited government is achieved when the laws are
non-arbitrary, general and abstract (Cf. Locke, TTG: 148); and when they refer to an
unknown number of people in an unknown number of instances. Liberty is achieved
under ”the reign of general and equal laws.” (CoL: 222) (Principle 2)
The government, as the legal framework for the protection of the private sphere, must
follow  principles  and  guidelines  that  facilitate  the  market  order.  Hayek's  amoral
understanding of the market as a “spontaneous order” (CoL:  passim) justifies a large
degree of economic inequality. This is probably the origin of Hayek's reputation as the
ultimate enemy of the redistributive welfare state.
The chapter in CoL, ”Taxation and redistribution” (430-450) contains a harsh attack on
the ideas of redistributive justice. He opposes the progressive income tax (CoL: 441)
and wishes to "limit the maximum rate of direct taxation." (CoL: 450). However, his
opposition  to  the  progressive  income  tax  is  not  a  necessary  consequence  of  his
principles. There is no reason why a slightly progressive scale would not be compatible
with the liberal demand for generality and universality. Indeed, Smith thought so much
(WoN: 653).
Perhaps the most anti-welfarist section in all of Hayek's writings is his attack on the
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concept “social justice” found in Volume 2 of LLL (169-341: “The Mirage of Social
Justice”).  He really hated that word, and people who used it.  The gist  of it  is  this:
“Strictly speaking, only human conduct can be called just or unjust. […] To apply the
term 'just' to [the society as a whole] is a category mistake.“ (LLL: 198) Hayek thus
argues that 'social justice' is a meaningless term. 
This  derives  from  his  understanding  of  the  market  society  as  the  result  of  the
spontaneous actions  of  individuals  following the rules  of  free market  exchange.  Of
course fraud, theft and murder should be punished. But beyond this justice has no role.
In the marketplace, there are also winners and losers, but these are a) necessary for the
system to operate; and b) nobody's fault. It may be unjust that bad things happen to
good people. But it is nobody's fault. It just happens.
However, I think Hayek puts the point too strongly here. He is right that we probably
shouldn't apply the word “unjust” to the unfortunate fact, say, that some firms succeed
while  others  go  bankrupt.  Such  uncertainty  is  part  of  the  rational  expectations  of
individuals.  But  we  can,  and  should,  criticize  the  justice  or  injustice  of  the  public
institutions and legal frameworks of society. So, in the case above, if the owners of the
firm that went bankrupt are not granted a social safety net (which Hayek supports) and
are driven homeless, this is probably a case of unjust institutions. A society where, say,
education,  welfare  and  environmental  protection  are  not  sufficiently  granted  to  all
people should be called 'unjust', precisely in the same sense that violations of the 1 st
Principle of liberalism in the case of thefts and murders are patently 'unjust.' 
Overall, I think Hayek's argument is very problematic and one-sided. The important
lesson,  for  my  analysis,  is  that  it  suggests  that  we  should  limit  redistributive
interventions to the most general level,  by tweaking the abstract rules of the game.
(This seems to suggest something like a Basic Income Guarantee. See Chapter 6.)
Hayek also shared the 19th Century liberals' distaste for majority rule, and much for the
same reasons: "democracy has yet to learn that, in order to be just, it must be guided in
its action by general principles." (CoL: 441) Unlimited democracy, without sufficient
boundaries, is ”an open invitation to discrimination [whereby any] pretended principle
of justice must become the pretext for pure arbitrariness.” (CoL: 441)
However,  this  is  not  the  end  of  the  story.  Despite  his  reservations  for  active
redistribution and 'social justice', he allowed that the state had an important role to play
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beyond the minimal state. This is the limited welfare state.
"The coercive activities of government are by no means its only tasks. 
[…]  Under  modern  conditions  [...]  it  seems  hardly  practicable  that  
government should provide such services as the care for the disabled or 
the infirm and the provision of roads or of information without relying 
on its coercive powers to finance them. […] Up to a point, most of us 
find it expedient, however, to make such contributions on the 
understanding that we will in turn profit from similar contributions of  
others toward the realization of our own ends.” (CoL: 211)
He allowed for many services. We shall later pay special attention to his support for a
guaranteed income floor as the best example of a public policy recommendation of the
limited welfare state. But let us first look at Hayek's general recommendations.
We have seen that Adam Smith allowed for a wide range of public actions, as long as 
they complied with certain limitations. Ultimately, public actions should facilitate the 
commercial society and the free market society rather than trying to control it. The 
classical liberal tradition is a balancing act between respect for private property and 
limited government and the obvious need for an institutional framework of laws.
As Hayek explains about his own position: “Only the coercive measures of government
need be strictly limited. [However,] there is undeniably a wide field for non-coercive 
activities of government and there is a clear need for financing them by taxation. 
Indeed, no government in modern times has ever confined itself to the 'individualist 
minimum'.” (CoL: 374) 
In fact, in The Constitution of Liberty, on pages 332-333 alone, Hayek lists no less than 
eleven particular ”services” that the government, under the rule of law, may 
legitimately and fruitfully undertake – in addition to the pure libertarian framework – 
without infringing the liberties of its citizens. The list is not intended to be 
comprehensive, but merely suggestive. ”A great many of the activities which 
governments have universally undertaken in this field […] fall within the limits 
described” (332). Indeed, ”there are fields in which the desirability of government 
action can hardly be questioned” because such action can ”assist the spontaneous forces
of the economy” (331); wherever “there is no violation of principle” of the rule of law 
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(332). So, according to Hayek – in a list reminiscent of Adam Smith and the early 
classical liberals – acceptable government actions include, but are not limited to: 
1) the acquisition of reliable knowledge;
2) the provision of the monetary system;
3) the setting of standards of weights and measurements;
4) gathering information from surveying, land registration, statistics, etc.;
5) supporting (and perhaps organizing) some kind of education;
6) sanitary and health services;
7) the construction and maintenance of roads;
8) municipal amenities;
9) public works (à la Adam Smith);
10) secret military preparations;
11) the advancement of knowledge;
These services, in general, are aimed to ”assist the spontaneous orders of the economy.”
(331) Their utilitarian justifications can be divided into two camps. The services (1)-(5)
are useful for a market society because they increase the information freely available to 
individuals: ”All these activities of government are part of its effort to provide a 
favourable framework for individual decision; they supply means which individuals can
use for their own purposes.” (332) The services (6)-(11), on the other hand, ”are clearly 
desirable, but […] will not be provided by competitive enterprise because it would be 
either impossible or difficult to charge the individual beneficiary for them.” (332-333) 
Thus, all those services, (1)-(11), should be provided for by the state. 
Quite a list for an avowed enemy of “social justice”! If advocating for such public 
goods makes someone a social democrat, then Hayek, too, is a social democrat, just like
Adam Smith before him. But this, of course, would be a false impression. Smith and 
Hayek were not social democrats, but classical liberals who believed in a 
consequentialist defence of the Three Principles: 1) Private property, 2) Limited 
government; 3) And, within these limits, the provision of some public goods.
Hayek “was not, contrary to what many people imagine, opposed to the welfare state as
such. He acknowledged that 'there are common needs that can be satisfied only by
collective action'  [Hayek: 374] […]. Nor was he opposed in principle to government
regulation  of  working  conditions,  building  codes,  and  so  on.  Hayek's  criticism  of
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proposals for the welfare state lay not so much with the aims as with the methods of
government  action.”  (Muller:  205)  He  wanted  to  limit  the  sphere  of  government
(Principle 2) and to protect the private sphere (Principle 1). For this end, he opposed
extending government powers too far, and in curtailing the private sphere too far. These
two are interrelated concerns (just like Principle 1 and 2 are, as I have shown many
times before, interrelated principles). Governments must fall within these limits.  Like
Smith, he was mostly concerned with eliminating all the monopolistic, bureaucratic and
market-inhibiting functions of the government that threatened to overtake and destroy
the spontaneous order of the market.
Thus, if the government wished to provide, say, health services for the elderly, it ought
to do so in a way that was compatible with a free market society. There is a wide range
of (non-monopolistic) public services that Hayek approves of, or at least tolerates, in a
free  society:  in  addition  to  the  list  mentioned  earlier,  he  supported  e.g.  anti-
discrimination laws (CoL: 203); child protection (CoL: 499); and funding for higher
education and scientific research (CoL: 505). In both CoL and LLL the government he
outlines has a rather active role in providing for many public goods and functions. 
Why,  though,  should  the  state  provide  all  these  things?  Beyond  the  general
consequentialist aims of trying to foster a framework of good laws compatible with a
commercial  society,  Hayek  doesn't  have  a  single,  dominant  answer.  His  arguments
often seem almost ad hoc,  as Tomasi (2012: 47) points out.  However,  it  should be
realized that his method is more eliminative than productive. He is trying to determine
which state actions are inadmissible, and not which actions are admissible. Like a good
liberal, he is trying to set “chain the Leviathan.” His aim is to determine the limits that
the  welfare  state  ought  to  respect:  “my  whole  effort  was  to  distinguish  between
legitimate and illegitimate action.” (Hayek on Hayek: 123) 
As he writes, “it is the character rather than the volume of government activity that is 
important. A functioning market economy presupposes certain activities on the part of 
the state; there are some other such activities by which its functioning will be assisted; 
and it can tolerate many more, provided that they are of the kind which are compatible 
with a functioning market.” (CoL: 331, my emphasis) Hayek does not oppose the 
welfare state as such. He actively encourages many government functions and tolerates 
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even more. Even an extensive welfare state might be permissible if it operates within 
the parameters of “assist[ing] the spontaneous forces of the economy.” (CoL: 331)
So his project, in CoL and LLL, is primarily negative: of determining what the state 
should not do. However, there is at least one strong positive argument: the argument in 
favour of the correction of market failures. Thus, although the negative approach is 
mostly concerned with reducing the harm that government may do (by its methods), the
positive approach is concerned with increasing the overall efficiency of the “system of 
natural liberty” (WoN: 560). The government's role can be beneficial.
The benefit of a government provision of certain services is that it corrects a persistent 
market failure: the underproduction of public goods. For when an individual “knows 
that compulsion can be applied only if it is applied to all including himself, it will be 
rational for him to agree to be compelled, provided this compulsion is also applied to 
others.” (LLL: 385, my emphasis)
Hayek's argument, borrowed from neoclassical economics, is that the government, in 
providing a public good, improves the efficiency and utility of the economy. 
Technically speaking, the unregulated market can lead to a Pareto-suboptimal 
distribution - underproduction and underconsumption - of certain goods (“public 
goods”) that have large positive externalities that benefit everybody equally. And since 
the overall social consequences of those positive externalities can be quite large, there 
is a good reason to extend the powers of the government to tax and fund such a 
program. Hayek, as a consequentialist, is open-minded about such issues. His concern 
is always to look at the large-scale rules of the society. He understands that the market 
society might benefit from certain limited collective actions. It is only necessary that 
such government programs fall within the boundaries of certain liberal principles. 
These boundaries are familiar from Adam Smith. For example, “the fact that some 
services must be financed by compulsory levies by no means implies that such services 
should also be administered by government.” It's better to use “competitive enterprise” 
and “the spontaneous mechanism of the market” to find optimal solutions to their 
production. This implies a strong ban on government monopolies, and the active 
advancement of citizen and consumer choice. (LLL: 386-387)
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But the fundamental point is that there is nothing particularly wrong with the 
government using its powers to provide a limited range of public goods and other 
collective actions, since it is “rational … to agree to be compelled” (LLL: 385) to a 
framework of laws that is to the benefit of practically everybody. So, the rationalist 
justifications work together with the utilitarian-consequentialist ones.
5.4 Additional Arguments for Redistribution
Hayek's argument – that it is “rational … to agree to be compelled” (LLL: 385) is 
similar to the arguments that Locke made in favour of private property. As I have 
shown, private property, in reducing the overall level of coercion in society, makes it 
rational for everybody to agree to compelled by its limits. And likewise with the laws of
the state: a coercive government whose coercive powers are limited to minimizing 
private coercion (aside from the production of the limited range of welfare functions 
justified under Principle 3) helps to decrease the amount of coercion and suffering in 
the society. It is thus rational for everybody to agree to be compelled by its limits.
Thus we have a chain of rational arguments in favour of the Three Principles:
1. Private property is a rational solution to the problem of peaceful and 
prosperous coexistence in an advanced society22.
2. The limited government is a rational solution to the problem of how to ensure 
that Principle (1) is enforced.
3.  The limited welfare state is a rational solution to the problem of how to enable
the government to make Pareto-improvements: e.g. to prevent that public goods are 
systematically underproduced by the market [without violating Principles (1) and (2)].
Let us recap the arguments in favour of the Three Principles. Classical liberals have 
argued for the limited welfare state from a multitude of directions. They have all agreed
that any welfare functions need to respect principles (1) and (2) of liberalism. Some, 
22 The longer version: We need to respect private property (under a limited government) because it 
enables a peaceful and prosperous coexistence, which enables the best use of the productive resources of 
the society, which makes it possible for the welfare level of the society to advance to new heights.
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like Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek, have argued for the limited production of certain
public goods and market-improving institutions from an economic efficiency 
perspective. Others, like John Locke and Henry George, have also argued from the 
perspective of fair compensation. The latter argue either that a) private property and 
land-ownership leave some people worse off, or that b) while they might benefit 
everybody, they nonetheless might benefit some people disproportionately.
Thomas Paine, in Agrarian Justice, argued that “[e]very individual in the world is born 
therein with legitimate claims on a certain kind of property, or its equivalent.” (article 
i05) From this basis he argues that property should be taxed and shared, as Basic 
Income, to all citizens of the society. (For Basic Income, see next chapter.) Locke 
argued in terms of Charity that can be interpreted to demand the same. (TTG: I, §42)
Let us call this the Locke-Paine argument in favour of fair compensation of the 
monopoly privileges of private property and land ownership:
1. Private property benefits everybody.
2. But, it grants disproportionate utility to property owners over non-owners. 
3. Thus we need to both defend private property and to compensate non-owners. 
4. Thus we need a limited welfare state (with limited redistributive capacities).
Hardcore rights-based libertarians deny the importance of such consequentialist 
arguments as (1). They also wish to deny (2), since they consider private property a 
natural right and definitely not a privilege. Consequently, they thus deny arguments (3) 
and (4) for the limited welfare state. Consequentialist hardcore libertarians, on the other
hand, usually have to argue that (2) and (3) do not follow from (1). But many bleeding-
heart libertarian, and practically all classical liberals, accept some form of the above 
argument. The Lockean proviso (TTG: §27) is an example of it; as is the Smithean 
argument about the malign effects of factory work on the workers. (WoN: 603) 
With these two arguments, we now have a classical liberal defence of the limited 
welfare state. The first argument we can call the neoclassical / public goods argument. 
The second argument let's call the Lockean / fair compensation argument. They are 
hardly exhaustive, but together they provide a good prima facie case for a limited 
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welfare state. They both suggest that a limited welfare state might be a Pareto-
improvement for the society. Combining them all, we have a good consequentialist 
basis for going slightly beyond the minimal state and the libertarian paradigm.
In the next chapter we shall see that the best application, so far developed, of a 
Lockean-Smithean-Hayekian welfare state function, and one that best satisfies all Three
Principles of liberalism, is the unconditional Basic Income Guarantee (BIG).
  6.   Theory into Practice: The Basic Income Guarantee
The Basic Income Guarantee (BIG), aka. guaranteed minimum income, is a proposal to 
replace the current welfare state23, or a significant portion of it, with an unconditional 
cash granted given to all citizens once a month, irrespective of their age, need, 
occupation, gender, wealth and status. It would be given to all citizens as a matter of 
right. BIG has been defended by many classical liberals (Paine 1797; Friedman 1962; 
Buchanan 1997) as well as by many non-liberal and socialist thinkers. In this chapter, I 
will argue that it solves the problem of combining welfare with a market economy 
under a limited government. It thus fits the utopia of the limited welfare state.
Constitutionally enshrined BIG forms a part of the basic framework of the security 
apparatus of the society. It cannot be denied to any citizen, nor is anybody given more. 
Thus it implements the third principle of liberalism in an equal way to everybody.
Since it leaves it up to the individuals how they wish to spend the money, it respects the
libertarian "self-ownership" core of liberalism. Since it supports the efforts of 
individuals to improve their own lives in the job market, by providing (uncoerced) 
incentives for low wage-earners, it supports the market economy. Since it is does not 
dictate to people how they should use the money, it allows for non-patterned outcomes. 
Since it eliminates political privileges to special groups, it reduces rent-seeking in 
society. And since it supports individual responsibility and entrepreneurial risk-taking, 
due to the added security and stability it provides, it supports wealth production in the 
market economy. It enhances the utilitarian aims of the market democratic society.  
23 E.g. Charles Murray (2006), a libertarian conservative, has proposed it as a way to replace the entire 
welfare state infrastructure of targeted redistributive programs with a single, non-burecrautic alternative.
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Thus it represents an improvement over competing welfare proposals. This suggests 
that the limited welfare state should incorporate a BIG.
Liberal arguments for the BIG have been put forward in the book Basic Income and the
Free Market (ed. Nell, 2013). It shows that Hayek, Buchanan and Friedman (all of 
whom we shall look at below) offer a defence of BIG as market-friendly welfare.
The central conclusion of the book is that ”a nonintrusive redistribution like the BIG 
might actually represent an improvement upon pure laissez-faire.” (3) Optimal free 
markets might need a bit of state intervention, but within strict limits. This, as I have 
shown with from Smith and Tomasi, is the typical position of classical liberalism. They 
consider a combination of substantially free markets and a robust system of governance
to be an improvement over both laissez-faire libertarianism and socialist planning.
The BIG can be supported, and has been supported, from many different perspectives. 
Let us start by analysing Hayek's defence of the guaranteed minimum income.
                    6.1 Hayek's Proposal: “Minimum Income for Everyone”24
Hayek has argued for a minimum income floor in practically all his writings (1944; 
1960; 1982). We already encountered it in our discussion of his general theory.
In The Road to Serfdom (1944), that famous tractate written against the anti-liberal 
welfare state, Hayek argues that a liberal society should have a program against 
poverty: "There is no reason why in a society which has reached the general level of 
wealth which ours has attained the [...] security [of a minimum income] should not be 
guaranteed to all without endangering general freedom." (RtS: 148)
But guaranteeing the absolute minimum floor is as far as it goes, according to Hayek: 
"any further provision [beyond the limited welfare provision] required for the 
maintenance of the accustomed standard should be left to competitive and voluntary 
efforts.” (CoL: 426) The redistributive power of the welfare state is strictly limited.
He never changed his mind on the desirability, or at least the acceptability, of such a 
24 LLL: 55.
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scheme. And he always argued for it in the same terms, on the basis of compatibility 
with the general framework of liberal laws. A defence of a kind of a uniform “minimum
income” appears in his very early works as well as in all his later major works.
In his magnum opus, The Constitution of Liberty (1960), he writes: ”We shall again 
take for granted the availability of a system of public relief which provides a uniform 
minimum for all instances of proved need, so that no member of the community need 
be in want of food or shelter.” (CoL: 424) 
And, decades later, in Law, Legislation and Liberty (1982): "The assurance of a certain 
minimum income for everyone, or a sort of floor below which nobody need fall even 
when he is unable to provide for himself, appears not only to be wholly legitimate 
protection against a risk common to all, but a necessary part of the Great Society in 
which the individual no longer has specific claims on the members of the particular 
small group into which he was born." (LLL: 55) 
Hayek's arguments can be used to justify a guaranteed minimum income of the sort that
the Basic Income Guarantee might introduce. The most persuasive argument that a BIG
would be the best solution to Hayek's welfarism is the following quotation:
“The basic conception of classical liberalism, which alone can make 
decent and impartial government possible, is that government must 
regard all people as equal, however unequal they may in fact be, and that 
in whatever manner the government restrains (or assists) the action of 
one, so it must, under the same abstract rules, restraint (or assist) the 
actions of all others. Nobody has special claims on government because 
he is either rich or poor, beyond the assurance of protection against all 
violence from anybody and the assurance of a certain flat minimum 
income if things go wholly wrong.” (Hayek, LLL: 143)
The above quotation emphasizes the following points:
1) That government regard all people as equal, however unequal they may in fact be;
2) That government assistance be universal in the sense of applying to all citizens;
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3) That government provide protection both in the sense of laws and social welfare;
4) That a “flat minimum income” is the best form of social welfare;
5) That beyond the assurance of such protection, nobody can have special claims.
I will argue that such a framework is a perfect justification for the BIG. 
The danger in extending redistributive policies beyond such a minimum are profound, 
according to Hayek. Even if we could justify more extensive redistributive measures in 
the name of social justice – which Hayek thinks we cannot do (See LLL: 169-341) – 
their implementation would probably end up doing a great deal of harm:
”Though we may have speeded up a little the conquest of want, disease, 
ignorance, squalor, and idleness, we may in the future do worse even in that 
struggle when the chief dangers will come from inflation, paralysing taxation, 
coercive labor unions, an ever increasing dominance of government in 
education, and a social service bureaucracy with far-reaching arbitrary powers –
dangers from which the individual cannot escape by his own efforts and which 
the momentum of the overextended machinery of government is likely to 
increase rather than mitigate.” (CoL: 429) 
Thus, going beyond the legitimate limits of government, and extending the use of its 
coercive powers too far, will lead to bad results. ”It is indeed probably that more harm 
and misery have been caused by men determined to use coercion to stamp out a moral 
evil than by men intent on doing evil.” (CoL: 213) This is a powerful consequentialist 
argument against expanding government power in its welfare functions.
Such considerations justify a limited welfare state. Liberalism, as the doctrine of limits, 
is concerned with finding both the upper limit to government action (how much is too 
much) and also the lower limit to government action (how much is too little). While it 
offers a (slightly-)more-than-minimal, classical liberal example of welfare, the 
Hayekian programme cannot be used to defend a more-than-limited, social-democratic 
threshold of welfare. The Three Principles of liberalism provide the guidelines within 
which such limits can be ascertained. Classical liberalism, in its search for the limits of 
government (i.e. my Three Principles), has always argued for limited social welfare.
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Hayek never wavered from his defence of the guaranteed minimum income: "I have 
always said that I am in favor of a minimum income for every person in the country." 
(Hayek on Hayek: 114) He never quite articulated clearly why he thought that "the case 
for the state's helping to organize a comprehensive system of social insurance is very 
strong." (RtS: 148) But he thought that as long as the principles of liberty and limited 
government are respected, "there is no incompatibility in principle between the state's 
providing greater security this way and the preservation of individual freedom." (ibid.)
As usual, Hayek's focus is on the macro-scale structures and rules of the society.
The boundary conditions – the limits of the welfare state – are the following:
1) The level of the minimum income must be sufficiently low to be affordable.
2) But the level must be sufficiently high to secure against extreme deprivations.
Within these limits Hayek fully supports the minimum income guarantee of some kind.
However, before we say that the Hayekian system is a good justification for the Basic 
Income Guarantee, we need to overcome one obstacle. Namely, that Hayek himself 
seems to have favoured a means-tested, rather than universal, benefit system.
He argued that ”that this minimum is provided only on proof of need and that nothing 
which is not paid for by personal contribution is given without such proof.” (CoL: 427) 
Hayek talks of the ”wholly irrational objection to a 'means test'” (ibid.) even though it 
is precisely the means-tested welfare programs which have entailed a massive increase 
in the discretionary powers of the today's welfare state.
Hayek acknowledged that this flatly contradicts his opposition to discretionary powers. 
But he argues that people on the benefits lose their right to complain: ”the objection 
against discretionary coercion can really provide no justification for allowing any 
responsible person an unconditional claim to assistance and the right to be the ultimate 
judge of his own needs. There can be no principle of justice in a free society that 
confers a right to 'non-deterrent' or 'non-discretionary' support irrespective of proven 
need.” (CoL: 428)
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So, his arguments for discretionary welfare bureaucracy run counter to his own 
principles, but he thinks – probably falsely – that they are necessary for the system. 
(And they probably would be, if the system was something else than a BIG.)
But Hayek's own arguments in favour of “abstract and general rules” (CoL: 209) speak 
in favour of BIG, instead. It falls within the parameters of a good Hayekian law, which 
he laid out as follows: "Law in its ideal form might be described as a "once-and-for-all"
command that is directed to unknown people and that is abstracted from all particular 
circumstances of time and place and refers only to such conditions as may occur 
anywhere and at any time.” (CoL: 218) This is a perfect description of a BIG.
I want to argue that, despite Hayek's own scattered thoughts on the subject, the best 
solution to the problem of welfare is not a means-tested system, which only tends to 
multiply the sort of bureaucratic power of the welfare state that Hayek elsewhere 
opposes, but a full basic income guarantee. It remains true that Hayek never argued 
explicitly in favour of a BIG. However, Hayek never argued against a Basic Income 
Guarantee, either. It seems that he never developed the details of the program.
He provided the general principles. It is incumbent on his readers to make their own 
interpretations. It is my interpretation25 that the BIG is almost a perfect match to 
Hayek's emphasis on a "guaranteed minimum income" implemented in the form of a 
"'once-and-for-all' command that is directed to unknown people and that is abstracted 
from all particular circumstances of time and place." (CoL: 218)
To further explain why a BIG is a good solution from the standpoint of classical 
liberalism, let us turn to Milton Friedman's proposal: the negative income tax.
                     6.2 Milton Friedman's Proposal
The Negative Income Tax (NIT) is a version of the Basic Income Guarantee.26 It was 
25 See also: Theodore Burczak: “A Hayekian Case for Basic Income” (2013).
26 The technical details are not important from a philosophical standpoint. We can take the NIT and BIG
to be practically equivalent. They are also very similar from the perspective of economics.
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made famous my Milton Friedman, who is one of the most important classical liberals 
of the 20th Century. In Chapter XII of his Capitalism and Freedom (1962), Friedman 
writes: "It can be argued that private charity is insufficient [. ...] To put it differently, we
might all of us be willing to contribute to the relief of poverty, provided everyone else 
did. [...] In the large impersonal communities that are increasingly coming to dominate 
our society, it is much more difficult" to rely on private charity. (157) He accepts "this 
line of reasoning as justifying governmental action to alleviate poverty; to set, as it 
were. a floor under the standard of life of every person in the community." (ibid.)
1) Private charity (read: voluntary action under Principle 1) is insufficient.
2) Government intervention (Principle 3) helps correct market inadequacies.
He is also a consequentialist defender of the free market. Although he defends certain 
public interventions, like NIT/BIG, as Pareto-improvements, he also thinks, like Smith, 
that Principles 1 and 2 of liberalism – private property rights and limits on government 
power - are even more important for the welfare of the people than Principle 3. Thus he
would never support a welfare program that would destroy, or negate, the free market.
He makes two further arguments in favour of a NIT/BIG over competing proposals:
"First, if the objective is to alleviate poverty, we should have a program directed
at helping the poor. There is every reason to help the poor man who happens to 
be a farmer, not because he is a farmer but because he is poor." (ibid, my 
emphasis)
The BIG is the preferred liberal solution, because it applies to all the people of the 
society rather than the desires of rent-seeking special interests. Aside from entailing 
taxation, it also respects the limits of private property and free market exchange:
"Second, so far as possible the program should, while operating through the 
market, not distort the market or impede its functioning." (158)
This (rather Smithean) proviso is a direct attack on many forms of bureaucracy – "price
supports, minimum-wage laws, tariffs and the like" (ibid.) - that have been 
implemented in a welfare state. Such proposals reduce economic freedom.
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The Basic Income Guarantee / Negative Income Tax, he argues, is the only solution that
fulfils these two criteria: “The advantages of this arrangement are clear. It is directed 
specifically at the problem of poverty. It gives help in the form most useful to the 
individual, namely, cash. It is general and could be substituted for the host of special 
measures now in effect. It makes explicit the cost borne by society. It operates outside 
the market." (158) These are all important elements of the limited welfare state.
Of course, Friedman does not argue in a vacuum. He is arguing in a situation where the 
government is already heavily invested in providing welfare benefits to poor people. He
is not arguing for the introduction of something that doesn't exist. He is arguing for the 
replacement of many existing programs with a single market-friendly and freedom-
friendly alternative. Friedman's proposal, in effect, consists in the limitation of the 
powers of the government in the welfare sector. Unlike Van Parijs (1995), for example, 
he is not arguing for the Basic Income from a human right perspective.
The precise method of implementation is a matter of politics rather than philosophy. 
But if we want to implement a limited welfare state without losing touch with, or 
having to get rid, of the libertarian core, we need something like a BIG or a NIT.
               6.3 James Buchanan's Proposal
James Buchanan, who explored classical liberalism in his book Limits of Liberty (1975)
- which we have quoted a few times - has elsewhere (1997) argued in defence of the 
third principle of liberalism. 
His solution shouldn't surprise us. As a classical liberal, he sees the BIG as the best 
means that a democratic society can provide for the welfare of its citizens. He calls his 
proposal the ”demogrant” which, like Friedman's NIT, is simply another name for BIG.
He argues that "a structure of equal per head transfer payments, or demogrants, 
financed by a flat rate of tax in all incomes, if effectively constitutionalized and 
removed from the agenda of ordinary majoritarian politics, would allow an affirmative 
answer, of sorts, to the question 'Can democracy promote the general welfare?' 
Legislative majorities would be empowered to set [...] the size of the demogrant, but 
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specific actions aimed at discriminating favourably or unfavourably [...] would be out 
of bounds". (1997: 171-2) Buchanan's focus is in limiting majority power and 
increasing constitutionality, and thus legitimizing democracy in a new way.
Such a system would increase public trust: "The expressed public dissatisfaction with 
the modern welfare state may be traced, in part, to the failure to keep transfer programs 
within the limits of generality that [...] promote the general welfare." (1997: 179). 
In such a system, the "democratic process [...] is not allowed to degenerate into the 
cross-group redistributive transfer absurdity that describes" existing welfare 
democracies (1997: 172). It is thus a mechanism of keeping democracy within strict 
limits: the limited government (Principle 2). The limits are set by the constitution, 
which protects freedom from coercion (Principle 1). The BIG is the limited welfare 
principle (Principle 3) enacted in the constitutional framework of a liberal society.
Buchanan is just the last in a long line of classical liberal thinkers who have argued for 
the BIG. The popularity of the BIG is no accident. The argument, from Hayek and 
Friedman to Buchanan, is clear: since an intrusive and expansive welfare state, with 
wide powers of coercion, would threaten to destroy individual freedom, it is important 
to formulate such a welfare redistribution mechanism, such as BIG, which avoids all 
these problems, and which might, in fact, help to reduce the size of the government – 
but without sacrificing the capacity of the society to provide welfare for everybody.
Before closing the chapter, let us quickly take a look at the work of the most important 
philosopher of the basic income guarantee, Philippe van Parijs. His proposal is not 
exactly classical liberal, but social liberal – which makes it even more interesting.
6.4 Philippe van Parijs's (Rawlsian) Proposal
In Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? (1995), 
philosopher Philippe van Parijs provides a Rawlsian, “real-libertarian”, case for BIG. 
Such a social liberal framework shares many similarities with classical liberalism.
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It would be fruitful to compare the Hayekian market welfare society with a social 
liberal welfare society in Rawlsian lines. We can only take the first steps in that 
direction here through van Parijs's work. He is also perhaps the most important living 
proponent of the BIG, so it will benefit us greatly to study his proposal carefully.
Van Parijs draws heavily from the classical liberal definition, broadly defined, because 
he accepts the importance of liberty as the supreme value of organizing society. For 
example, he writes: ”[J]ustice is about the distribution of freedom, not about the 
distribution of happiness.” (59) He calls his system “real-libertarianism”, which 
demands an equal distribution of “real” opportunities. But he is also definitely a social 
liberal: "I like Rawls a lot and often have the feeling that, deep down, he's got it all 
right.” (90)
Van Parijs argues that Rawls's difference principle recommends itself, contrary to 
Rawls's own preferences (for a conditional programme similar to Hayek's), to a fully 
unconditional basic income solution: ”Rawls's position and in particular his Difference 
Principle appear to recommend – subject to the respect of fundamental liberties and of 
fair equality of opportunity – that one should introduce a wealth-distributing, power-
conferring, self-respect-preserving unconditional basic income, indeed that one should 
introduce such an income at the highest sustainable level." (95-96) 
For van Parijs, Rawls's difference principle serves a similar function that Hayek's 
"minimum income"-principle (CoL: 424) does for me: it provides an argument for a 
liberal welfare program in the style of the Basic Income Guarantee. This suggests that 
under certain reading of Rawls and Hayek, similar outcomes can be reached. It 
shouldn't surprise us, either, since the social liberal traditions of Rawls and Hayek share
many similar elements (see Tomasi: 226). Hayek knew this, too. Despite his opposition 
to “social justice”, Hayek even makes a few positive remarks about Rawls (LLL: 261).
The classical liberals would also agree with Parijs's statement "that people should be 
held responsible for their choices (and indeed for their preferences), that justice is about
equal [...] possibilities, and that the mess or wonders people make of these possibilities 
do not need to corrected.” (Parijs: 169) The emphasis is on rules of the game, and the 
long-term overall effects, not the inequalities or anecdotal losers that it creates.
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As a faithful Rawlsian, Van Parijs argues that economic freedom and the resulting 
inequality can be justified only if the least-well-off are thus better off. This is not a 
completely dissimilar argument, either. We shall remember that Locke and Smith 
argued for private property as a means of helping the poor, too. These arguments are 
similar, but not identical: the classical view allows for more resulting inequalities.
Like Hayek's classical liberalism, Van Parjis's social liberalism exhibits an unabashed 
”presumption in favour of optimal capitalism” over any conceivable kind of socialism 
(189). This leads to a rather ”negative conclusion about socialism” (190). But it is still 
compatible, according to its author, with some aspects/versions of libertarian socialism,
unlike Hayek's system. Nonetheless, Van Parijs's real-libertarian utopian society is best 
understood as ”a form of capitalism that incorporates a basic income, supplementary 
targeted transfers, predictable taxation, and environmental protection” (210). This 
description could also apply to some conceivable bleeding-heart libertarian society.
Perhaps I could sum up: classical liberalism places more emphasis on libertarianism; 
social liberalism on egalitarianism. The core is the same. Let me quote Van Parijs:
”What is, then, a free society? It is a society whose members are all really free – or 
rather, as really free as possible. More precisely, it is a society that satisfies the 
following three conditions:
1. There is some well enforced structure of rights (security).
2. This structure is such that each person owns herself (self-ownership)
3. This structure is such that each person has the greatest possible opportunity to 
do whatever she might want to do (leximin opportunity)". (25)
Despite the odd Rawlsian phrase (“leximin”), such a framework sounds very similar.
All we need to state is that the different traditions, here, converge on a single point: a 
"cash grant – a guaranteed minimum income of purchasing power – is favoured from a 
real-libertarian (and, let me add, also a market liberal) perspective" (41).
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Since Van Parijs derives very heavily from Rawlsianism, we can surmise that (some 
forms of) Rawlsian social liberalism would not look that different from (some forms of)
market liberalism. The precise differences and similarities between Rawls and Hayek 
unfortunately cannot be developed further now, since our focus is elsewhere.
The Parijsian state meets the ”requirements of formal freedom [:] Police, courts, an 
effective military or civil defence against external threats, adequate mechanism for 
collective decision-making at the various territorial levels." This is the libertarian core 
of liberalism. These are necessary because, like classical liberalism, ”[r]eal-freedom-
for-all consists in [increasing] people's opportunities on the background a of a well-
enforced structure of self-ownership-protecting rights.” (43) (Principle 1)
The Parijsian welfare state is also a form of limited welfare state, quite similar to Hayek
and Smith. All these thinkers agree on the general principle that the state has a role in 
providing for public goods such as education, infrastructure, clean air, public highways 
and public parks. (Principle 3) He thinks that there is probably no need for the state to 
pay for university education, sports facilities and opera tickets. He is open, however, to 
the idea that the state provide ”compulsory basic health insurance” and a few other 
”mild form[s] of paternalism” (45). But that is about it. Van Parijs wishes to limit the 
state - even in its welfare functions. (Principles 2 & 3) 
Such a scheme, he claims, is a "fair way of distributing external-resource-based real 
freedom [where] people's endowments [are] valued in terms of competitive prices.” 
(54) His welfare scheme is a form of Pareto-optimizing, opportunity-maximizing, 
equality-increasing Rawlsian liberalism.
Although he accepts self-ownership and a mostly free market, Philippe van Parijs also 
argues against a literal reading of the first two (libertarian) principles of liberalism. 
Even a perfectly competitive market "needs to be supplemented with a fair distribution 
of opportunities.” (169) The libertarian core needs to be supplemented by the welfare 
principle that goes beyond Hayek.
Neither Rawls or Hayek were in favour of an unconditional BIG, but their arguments 
have led many of their readers to draw the – I think correct – conclusion that a BIG is 
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the best answer to the fundamental welfare liberal principles that they expounded.
The importance of the BIG is that it is compatible with a classical liberal society. It 
fulfils the boundary conditions (limits) that people like Hayek, Buchanan and Friedman
have placed for any liberal welfare program. And it can even be justified on Rawlsian, 
social liberal, grounds, as Van Parijs shows. Most importantly, it provides a practical 
application of the bleeding-heart libertarian welfare principle (Principle 3).
I have now reached the end of my analysis of the limited welfare state. It is a society in 
which the state does not “forbid capitalist acts between consenting adults” (Nozick: 
163), but in which a Basic Income is guaranteed to all as an automatic safety net.
Now is the time to gather my thoughts. Let me start by exploring some of the problems 
that remain. These are matters that deserve further study, which cannot be given here.
                  7. Open Problems for Further Research
1. The relationship to the social liberal tradition
From the outset, I chose not to directly engage with Rawls and other important social 
liberals. This was by design, since I decided to focus on market liberty. Rawlsianism is 
a powerful paradigm that deserves an equally powerful competitor from bleeding-heart 
libertarianism. However, it becomes clear that the Rawlsian focus on "basic liberties" 
and the "difference principle" seems to be somewhat similar to the Three Principles of 
the classical liberal paradigm. We have also seen that Philippe van Parijs, who is a 
follower of the Rawlsian paradigm, ends up defending a framework of society that is 
pretty close to the framework of society we have advocated under the classical liberal 
paradigm. But we have also seen that there are differences in the way these two 
traditions draw the boundaries of the welfare state. However, these are only preliminary
sketches, and any further comparisons will need to be made elsewhere.
2. The hardcore libertarian challenge
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We have argued that the hardcore libertarian interpretation of classical liberalism is not 
sufficient for a good society. However, we have not quite proved the point. We have, at 
most, showed that the Nozickean arguments for absolute or unlimited property rights 
are not satisfactory. Nozick fails to prove that the minimal state is the most extensive 
state that can be justified. But there is a wide range of in-depth arguments, from 
Spencer to Rothbard, that would need further analysis. The hardcore libertarian 
challenge remains a strong contender with the classical liberal paradigm - especially 
because bleeding-heart libertarianism seems much “messier” (Tomasi: 49) in 
comparison. There is a powerful lure in the logical simplicity and elegance of the 
hardcore libertarian arguments, which, however, I think we should resist on 
consequentialist grounds; and also because their foundations are weak. They do not 
lead to a satisfying utopia, although they probably make for beautiful theories.
3. The ultimate justifications of the liberal principles: rights or consequences?
It is surely a failure of the liberal tradition that it has failed to deliver a coherent, 
systematic defence of the Three Principles. Different thinkers approached the moral 
foundations of property rights and the legitimacy of government in different ways, and 
they all provide different arguments for or against government intervention in particular
areas. (See Tomasi: 47) The libertarians provided a systematic account of property 
rights and economic freedom that satisfied those who wanted a logically coherent 
theory based on axiomatic first principles. The most we can say for the liberal approach
is that it seems to provide a good blueprint for a pluralistic, prosperous and progressive 
society, using a combination of consequentialist and rights-based arguments. Its 
negative freedom approach places limits on the coercion that individuals may do to one 
another (property rights), and limits on the coercion that governments may do to 
citizens (limited government), while, within these limits, providing a limited range of 
public institutions, regulations and welfare policies (the limited welfare state). 
However, perhaps the quest for ultimate foundations is a bit futile? I have, at least, 
offered the consequentialist approach as the most plausible and coherent vision.
4. The question of the limits of government powers: How to tame the ''Leviathan'?
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We have seen that the second principle of liberalism aims to limit government. 
However, we have also seen that, from Locke and Smith to Hayek and Tomasi, the 
precise limits of government power are hard to decipher. How much regulation is 
permitted? What counts as a "public good"? When is majoritarian democracy allowed 
to trump individual choice? The third principle and the second principle often seem to 
undercut the first principle (libertarianism). These questions are so immense that they 
cannot be satisfactorily answered by a recourse to the Three Principles alone.
                 8. Conclusions: Liberty  and   Welfare
We have seen that classical liberalism converges on the the Three Principles:
“[C]lassical liberalism, in its traditional formulation, affirms a thick conception 
of economic liberty and a formal conception of equality. That conception 
nonetheless allows the state to impose taxes to support a limited range of social 
services that the market might not otherwise make available to all citizens.” 
(Tomasi: 47)
Classical liberalism, from Locke to Hayek, has argued that government needs to be 
limited in its power to legislate over individuals, even in the economic realm. The 
consequentialist arguments for a limited government have proven themselves firm.  
In reforming the welfare state, we should recapture, and reinterpret, the classical liberal 
notion of limiting government. However, the mere fact that government should be 
limited, and private choice should be respected, does not mean that the nature of those 
limits is simple and obvious. Liberals have differed amongst themselves as to the 
precise nature and extent of those limits. For example, they have differed amongst 
themselves as to whether any functions currently associated with a "welfare state" can 
be justified (and if so, to what extent?) in the context of a limited government.
A wide range of opinions and arguments have existed within the Lockean-Smithean 
legacy as to the precise limits of state power, and this paradigm has only been expanded
by the later additions, modifications and deviations. Nozick's theory, by contrast, is 
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presented as an elegant logical deduction from a set of natural property rights. But we 
should not be fooled by its seeming rationality. The notion of absolute property rights 
betrays a lack of foundations even more profound than that of the more eclectic 
classical liberalism. Lockean rights do not make sense without the modifiers of the 
Proviso(s), of Charity, and of Democracy. Thus the original Locke is better, if fuzzier.
I have argued that welfare without freedom is as unjust as freedom without welfare. 
The central message of the earlier classical liberals, as distinct from the hardcore 
libertarians and welfare liberals, remains fundamentally important for today. We can 
interpret classical liberalism as simultaneously a criticism of "really-existing" welfare 
state ideology – with its expansive bureaucracy, paternalistic legislation and special 
interest politics – but also a defence of a "utopian" limited welfare state.
With the following words, Locke justified the institution of private property:
“God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for their 
benefit...” (TTG: §34, my emphasis)
Without the boundaries, limit, side-constraints, between individuals' private spheres, the
world would remain a barren wasteland – or, at least, hugely underdeveloped. People 
like Smith and Hayek concur. I have tried to defend this approach, and to highlight the 
benefits that accrue from instituting fixed limits, not only to property in the strictest 
sense, but to all coercive action, including by the state. Thus Principles 1 and 2 – 
private property and limited government - are justified on consequentialist grounds.
Hayek and Smith offered similar arguments in defence of the doctrine of the limits. I 
have tried to show that these, while rudimentary and fragmented, are a good enough 
basis for taking the “libertarian core” of classical liberalism seriously as a necessary 
condition of any welfare-maximizing, Pareto-optimizing, society. The fixed rules of 
property and liberty allow for beneficial long-term “public utility” (Hume: §276).
The various consequentialist arguments, from the same thinkers, complement the 
system, and justify a limited range of public goods and a Basic Income Guarantee. 
They also preclude the welfare state from expanding beyond these limits: the limited 
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welfare state firmly opposes all ”absolute, arbitrary, unlimited, and unlimitable power 
over the lives, liberties, and estates” of individuals. (TTG: I, §9) The society that 
emerges from this is a bleeding-heart utopia, where the Three Principles of Classical 
Liberalism are instituted, guarded and developed, under the rule of law.
A philosophical defence of such a society cannot, of course, offer any details of its 
implementation, beyond prescribing certain boundary conditions and limits (on the 
basis of Smithean and Hayekian suggestions) that cannot be crossed. There remain 
many unanswered questions but the overall picture is, at least, coherent. 
Here is a summary of the differences between the “Three Principles”- and the “Two 
Principles”-schools – i.e. the bleeding-heart and hardcore libertarians, respectively:
A) The open-minded classical liberals (bleeding-heart libertarians):
Examples: Locke, Smith, Hayek, Friedman, Buchanan, Tomasi.
Principles: Strong property rights, limited government, some public goods.
Justification: Mostly consequentialist, with some rights-based elements.
B) The stringent classical liberals (hardcore libertarians):
Examples: Spencer, Bastiat, Nozick, Narveson, Rothbard.
Principles: Absolute property rights, minimal government, NO public goods.
Justification: Mostly rights-based, with some consequentialist elements.
I have defended the Three Principles of liberalism on consequentialist grounds. It is the 
more promising alternative. The bleeding-heart libertarian interpretation of classical 
liberalism – in which thick Lockean property rights and economic freedoms are 
supplemented by a strong but limited welfare state – leaves the relationship to the 
current welfare state inherently ambivalent. It can both defend and challenge it. I 
believe the consequentialist arguments for reforming the welfare state towards 
libertarianism are strong. I share the attitude of Hayek that rediscovering, and 
defending, such market-oriented welfare state solutions can ”rescue some of the more 
modest and legitimate aims [of social reformers] from the discredit which over-
ambitious attempts may well bring to all actions of the welfare state.” (CoL: 379) 
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The “doctrine of the limits” in the classical liberal canon represents an attempt to 
discover rational principles, universally binding of justice, with which to coordinate 
human action.  It represents the necessary (soft-)libertarian core of the ideal welfare-
maximizing society, in which both public and private coercion are minimized. On top 
of this foundation, the limited welfare state can be justified as a Pareto-improvement, 
since it increases the opportunities of the poor and the unlucky to live a decent life, thus
enabling the negative (neighbourhood) effects of private property to be compensated. 
Thus, the provision of limited public goods, and the Basic Income Guarantee, are 
justified, without abandoning the Lockean foundations of liberalism. The third principle
of liberalism complements the system, and actually buttresses the libertarian principles.
Libertarianism is the bastard “daughter” of classical liberalism. But a coherent classical
liberal philosophy needs to supplement the libertarian principles with the third principle
– the principle of limited welfare. The founders of classical liberalism thought so:
Locke's famous Proviso (TTG: §27) and Smith's arguments for public goods (WoN: 
534) are just two examples. And Hayek, one of the most important modern day 
defenders of liberalism, has made the case that an “assurance of a certain minimum 
income for everyone, or a sort of floor below which nobody need fall even when he is 
unable to provide for himself, appears not only to be wholly legitimate protection 
against a risk common to all, but a necessary part of the Great Society" (Hayek, LLL: 
55). Thus classical liberalism is innately concerned with combining liberty with 
(limited) welfare. This, I believe, follows from their consequentialist approaches.
More recently, Tomasi's bleeding-heart libertarianism has suggested that we should 
“advocate a system of economic liberty because that system advances the interests of 
all citizenry and most notably the interests of the poor.” (Tomasi: 141) This is simply a 
logical follow-up to the arguments of Locke, Smith and Hayek. 
It is for this reason that the “messier” (Tomasi: 49) tradition of classical liberalism, with
its emphasis on the positive role that government can play, especially in providing 
limited welfare, provides a better blueprint for a utopia that everybody can benefit from.
And the hardcore libertarian focus on rights, derived from a skewed reading of Locke, 
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fails precisely because it claims that it doesn't have to justify the usefulness of property 
rights, although it was precisely their usefulness that animated Locke's original theory.
No property can be justified without its beneficial effects to the society and the poor. 
“As justice gives every man a title to the product of his honest industry [...] so 
charity gives every man a title to so much out of another’s plenty, as will keep 
him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise”. 
(Locke, TTG: 1, §42)
The public goods and welfare measures of the limited welfare state can correct against 
certain market failures and improve the overall utility of the society. But while the 
limited welfare state can improve overall utility, it must also stay within its limits: “To 
the extent that collective action is allowed to break beyond the boundaries imposed by 
the mutuality of gains from exchange, both direct and indirect, the community has 
taken a major step backward into the anarchistic jungle.” (Buchanan 1975: 50)
There will always be desires of individuals that cannot be satisfied by such a limited 
arrangement; some people will, no doubt, feel cheated, or let down, by the collective 
institutions. Public institutions can be so designed as to minimize harm caused by the 
“creative destruction” of the free market. But the progress of civilization depends on 
the fact that individuals should be stripped of the power of coercing their fellow men. 
The aims of the welfare state should be limited, general, institutional and long-term.
There remain, of course, innumerable unsettled questions about the precise contours of 
the just limits of state power. There might be need to extend state power further. New 
understanding of market failures, neighbourhood effects and environmental degradation
might entail the expansion of the traditional powers of government. But this need not 
lead us to abandon the principle that free and equal individuals, left to pursue their own 
interests, supported by an impartial framework of law, protected against interferences 
by their fellow men, are the best hope for a prosperous, pluralistic and progressive 
society. To safeguard the freedom of individuals, we should always be weary of 
extending government power beyond the limits established by the Three Principles of 
liberalism - even in the name of a good cause. Especially in the name of a good cause. 
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We need to rediscover classical liberalism, even while reinterpreting it, and questioning
its foundations, as a fruitful doctrine for 21st Century political philosophy. To that end, 
the classical liberal “doctrine of limits” - consisting of freedom from private and public
coercion – needs to be implemented firmly into the legal and political structure. 
The only way to make lasting advances in eliminating the ills of society – poverty, 
misery and ignorance – is to protect the domain of liberty. This can only be done by 
putting limits to coercive actions. No welfare (state) can last without a strong private 
sphere and a limited government. We need to keep in mind that a government without 
limits, no matter how noble its aims, is a government without hope.
“[A] wise and frugal Government, which shall restrain men from injuring one 
another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of 
industry and improvement” (Thomas Jefferson 1801, 1st Inaugural Address)
The consequentialist defence of the Three Principles demands that the “industry and 
improvement” produced under the “system of natural liberty” (WoN: 533) are allowed 
to continue to improve the living conditions of the the vast majority of the population.
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